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Political Science

The United States’ Earned Income Tax Credit and Canada’s Child Tax Benefit: Have
they proven to be effective ^tiychild poverty tools?
Director: Jeffrey Gree
In the mid-1990s, the United States and Canada reformed their public policy,
eliminating entitlement to cash assistance. Poor families were no longer entitled to social
assistance. The only cash-transfer programs that remained a guarantee to low-income
families were the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Canada Child Tax Benefit
(CCTB). However, these programs had only in the 1990s become major players in the
fight against child poverty. The EITC was substantially increased by OBRA 1990 and
OBRA 1993, while the CCTB was fully implemented in 1998. With conventional
welfare programs loosing ground, these “new” tax transfer programs were expected to
pick up some of the slack.
While the EITC’s and the CCTB’s budgets have seen increases in recent years, unlike
most of the other safety net programs, their effectiveness in combating child poverty
remains largely hypothetical. The programs are popular because they encourage work
and smaller families. In theory, they appear the ideal programs as they remedy many of
the disincentives that have accompanied traditional welfare programs. In addition, they
have low administrative costs; overall, the intended recipients are being targeted;
preliminary studies link them to increases in employment, particularly for female-headed
households, and decreases in the welfare caseload; the poverty rate and poverty gap have
been reduced in the United States and Canada, due to these programs. However
encouraging these findings appear, they do not reflect the magnitude of these
achievements. The increases in employment, decreases in welfare caseload, as well as
decreases in child poverty rate and gap, have all been minor.
Research reveals that the potential for large impact is present within these programs;
however, they must be restructured before they can effectively combat child poverty.
The credit rates must be increased and adjusted for family size. Furthermore, welfare
recipients should benefit from the EITC and the CCTB The credits should not be
counted as income for welfare recipients, but rather viewed as an incentive for them to
make the transition between welfare and work. Only once these reforms have taken place
will the EITC and the CCTB be able to call themselves child poverty tools.
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Introduction
Ever since the existence of governments, nations have struggled with poverty and its
eradication. While most countries provide some form of economic security to their
citizens, the question of how much, how long and who should benefit from the safety net,
is a key policy issue for all governments.
Countries must first identify what basis of need should be tackled by their programs.
Most nations agree that income security for the elderly and the disabled is a necessary
and legitimate program. However, they differ over the methods used to secure income
for the groups, even if there is no debate about their existence.
Poverty due to unemployment or inadequate income is a more controversial issue.
Both the United States and Canada have programs to supplement or substitute earnings
for the unemployed, and the working poor. Over the years, these programs have been a
point of contention for all governments. Canada and the United States have struggled
with the extending of income to the unemployed. In recent years, both countries have
severally reduced the last-resort welfare programs or modified them in order to eliminate
dependency and encourage work. States and provinces have introduced “workfare”
programs and the federal governments have increased substantially the amount of
benefits bestowed upon the working poor.
Public opinion has favored programs such as the United States’ Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) and the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) in the last decade. Americans
and Canadians support national programs that aim to break the “welfare cycle” and
compel individuals to take responsibility for their circumstances and those of their

families. Both countries have made these programs the largest cash transfers to working
families in an attempt to diminish the role of the welfare system. Welfare is easily the
most controversial of all income security programs, and the least popular from the
perspective of public support.^ While the EITC and the CCTB may be well liked by the
public, their anti-child poverty effectiveness has yet to be established.
This thesis will attempt to ascertain, through existing literature and studies carried
out by government and non-government organizations, whether the federal governments
of the United States and Canada are on the right track by utilizing the EITC and the
CCTB to fight child poverty. The first chapter will look at the United States’ and
Canada’s current poverty rates, the methods used to calculate child poverty, the causes of
poverty, and the programs currently in existence to fight poverty, and more specifically
child poverty. The second chapter will review the history of the EITC and the CCTB, as
well as how they work, and how they compare to each other. The third chapter will look
at each program’s characteristics: costs, recipients, employment rate and welfare caseload
effect, poverty rates and gap, as well as compliance, in an attempt to determine their
effectiveness in combating child poverty. The last chapter will review the findings to
determine whether the EITC and the CCTB are effective means of fighting child poverty.
Furthermore, the chapter will make recommendations in terms of the future of each
program. Are changes required, if so what should be done and should the programs
remain in existence? In conclusion, this paper will look at whether welfare policy is
headed in the right direction or whether changes need to be made for the United States

^Ken Battle and Sherri Torjman, The Post-Welfare State in Canada: Income-Testing and Inclusion, May
2001; available from< http://www.caledoninst.org/> Internet; accessed 26 November 2002, p. 4.
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and Canada to effectively ensure that today’s children will be able to successfully
become tomorrow’s citizens.

Chapter 1
Child poverty in the United States and Canada
The first chapter of this thesis will look at the concept of child poverty in the United
States and in Canada. First, it will outline the current statistics in comparison to the last
two decades. Second, it will describe how poverty is calculated in each country. Third, it
will explain the causes of child poverty. Last, it will review the programs that are
currently in place to combat child poverty.
Child poverty in the United States and in Canada is among the highest in all
industrialized countries. The United States ranks at the bottom, while Canada is only
ahead of Italy, Australia, and the United States.^ Historically, Canada has tended to be
more receptive to welfare spending, however, since Brian Mulroney took power in 1984,
Canada’s social spending has been radically reduced. Canada has begun to emulate its
neighbor to the south.

Child poverty in the United States
The poverty rate in 2001 in the United States was 11.7 percent, which is up fi*om
11.3 in 2000. The number of people below the poverty thresholds was 32.9 million, 1.3
million higher than the 31.6 million poor in 2000. The poverty rate for children did not
fiuctuate between 2000 and 2001. It remained at 16.3 percent, which is the highest of
any age group. In 2001, 11.7 million children were poor. At 35.7 percent, children
represent a disproportionate share of the poor, as they represent only one-fourth (25 .6

tim othy Smeeding, Lee Rainwater, and Gary Burtless, “United States Poverty in a Cross-National
Context,” Focus 21, no. 3 (Spring 2001) : 52.

4

percent) of the total population. Children under the age of six were at an even greater
risk of being poor. The poverty rate for children under the age of six was 18.2 percent in
2001. The poverty rate for individuals between the ages of 18 and 64 and those 65 and
over was at 10.1 percent in 2001, up slightly from 2000. Finally, the number of families
in poverty in 2001 was 6.8 million, up from 6.4 million in 2000.
While the percentage of children in poverty has not increased since 2000, child
poverty rates have remained consistently higher than any other age group. Figure 1.1
demonstrates the poverty rates since 1959 in all three age groups. The 65 and over group
has seen a large decline in poverty since the expansion of the social security program. In
the past, this group endured greater poverty rates than any other group; however, once the
government committed to targeting them through social security, their poverty rates
declined to rates analogous to adults between the ages of 18 and 64. As of 1996, 75.6
percent of the elderly were moved out of poverty by social insurance benefits.^
Undoubtedly, the government could reduce the child poverty rate if a program was
enacted to specifically target children.

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Strength o f the Safety Net: How the EITC, Social Security, and
Other Government Programs Affect Poverty, March 1998, available from< http://www.cbpp.org/snd98rep.htm> Internet; accessed 21 October 2002.

Figure 1.1 Poverty Rates by Age; 1959-2001
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1959-2001 Annual Demographic Supplement

Child poverty in Canada
Poverty in Canada has followed similar trends to that of the United States (it is
important to note at this point that their measures of poverty are different and will be
explained in the next section). In 2000, the poverty rate in Canada for children was 12.5
percent, down from the 1999 rate of 13.5 percent. An estimated 868,000 children under
age 18 were living in low-income families. An estimated 666,000 families of two or
more people had low-incomes in 2000, down from 714,000 in 1999. The low-income
rate declined also declined from 10.7 percent in 1996 to 7.9 percent in 2000. The poverty
rate for those 18 to 64 was 11 percent, down from 11.8 in 1999, while the poverty rate for
those 65 and over was 7.3 percent, down from 7.6 percent in 1999.
Figure 1.2 shows the time lines of all three age groups in Canada. The trends are
similar to those of the United States. The 65 years and over data reflect the importance
the Canadian government has attached to targeting elderly poverty in the last 20 years.

According to the Luxembourg Income Studies,^ Canada is a leader in combating elderly
poverty, ranking only behind Norway, Finland and Sweden, three of the most generous
countries in terms of social spending. Figure 1.2 demonstrates the ability of governments
to have an impact on poverty if the political will is present.
Figure 1.2 Persons in

65 years and over
under 18 years o f age
18 to 64 years

i

&mrce: Income Statistics Division, Statistics Canada

Measures of poverty
As noted earlier in this chapter, there is no universal measure of poverty. To
compare poverty among different countries, one can refer to the Luxembourg Income
studies. However, taking data from two different countries and comparing them is
dangerous. One must keep in mind the different measures used by each country when
comparing the data.
The United States calculates its official poverty population figures through the
poverty thresholds. The Census Bureau uses a set of money income thresholds that vary
by family size and composition to determine who is poor. If a family’s total income is
less than that family’s threshold, than that family, and every individual in it, is considered
poor. The poverty thresholds do not vary geographically (Alaska and Hawaii excluded),
^Ibid.

but they are updated annually for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). The
official poverty definition counts money income from all sources (even social security
and public assistance benefits) before taxes and does not include capital gains and
noncash benefits (such as public housing, Medicaid, and Food Stamps). After tax
government transfers, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit or the Child Tax Credit, are
not included in the income calculations. Individuals in military barracks, institutional
group quarters, or unrelated individuals under age fifteen (such as foster children) are not
included in the poverty definition. The Census Bureau updates the thresholds on a yearly
basis. Table 1.1 illustrates the poverty thresholds for the year 2000. For example, a
family with two children’s poverty threshold would be $17,463. Therefore, if the family
earned $21,000, its income would be greater than its’ threshold, and it would not be
considered poor.^
The United States has a second measure of poverty called the poverty guidelines.
They are issued each year in the Federal Register by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS). The guidelines are a simplification of the poverty thresholds for
administrative purposes, such as determining financial eligibility for certain federal
programs. The poverty guidelines do not distinguish between aged and non-aged units.
Programs using the guidelines (or percentage multiples of the guidelines — for instance,
125 percent or 185 percent of the guidelines) in determining eligibility include Head
Start, the Food Stamp Program, the National School Lunch Program, the Low-income
Home Energy Assistance Program, and the Children's Health Insurance Program. In
general, cash public assistance programs (Aid to Families with Dependent Children and
^U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty^ available from< http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty.htinl> Internet;
accessed 21 October 2002.
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Table 1.1

Size o f Fam ily
Unit

•
•

•

•

O ne person
(unrelated
individual)
U nder 65
years
65 years and
over
T wo persons
H ouseholder
under 65
years
Householder
65 years and
over
Three persons
Four persons
Five persons
Six persons
Seven persons
Eight persons
Nine persons or
m ore

Poverty Thresholds in 2000, b y size of family and number of
related children under 18 years (Dollars).
W eighted
average
thresholds

Related C hildren U nder 18 Y ears
None

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Six

Seven

Eight or
More

8,794
8,959

8,959

8,259

8,259

11,239
11,590

11,531

11,869

10,419

10,409

11,824

13,738
17,603
20,819
23,528
26,764
29,701

13,470
17,761
21,419
24,636
28347
31,704

13,861
18,052
21,731
24,734
28,524
31,984

13,874
17,463
21,065
24,224
27,914
31,408

17,524
20,550
23,736
27,489
30,904

20,236
23,009
26,696
30,188

22,579
25,772
29,279

24,758
28,334

28,093

35,060

38,138

38,322

37,813

37,385

36,682

35,716

34,841

34,625

33,291

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey.

its block grant successor Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Supplemental
Security Income) do not use the poverty guidelines in determining eligibility. The
Earned Income Tax Credit program uses its own income ranges to determine eligibility.^
Unlike the United States, Canada does not have an official poverty line. While
several measures of low income are used in Canada, the two most widely applied
indicators of low income are Statistics Canada’s Low-income Cut-Offs (LlCOs) and the
Low-income Measure (LIM). Both are relative measures that establish a dollar figure
below which a family is considered to be living on low income. They can be reported
measures, pre-tax (income including government transfers such as the Canada Child Tax
Benefit, before the deduction of income taxes) and after-tax (total income after the
Ibid.

deduction of income taxes). Both pre- and post-tax LlCOs are set according to the
proportion of annual income spent on basic needs (food, shelter and clothing). If a family
spends 70 percent or more of its income on these basic necessities, then it falls beneath
the LICO line. The size of the family and the community is taken into account, but
geographic differences in the cost of living are not This paper, like Statistics Canada,
focuses on the after-tax LlCOs, unless otherwise specified.^
The LIM was developed as an alternative to the LlCOs. It considers a family to be
living on low income if its income, adjusted for family size (number of adults and
children), is less than half of the median income (the income level at which the incomes
of half of all families are higher and half are lower). The post-tax-and-transfer LIM is
similar to measures used in international comparisons, but it does not reflect geographic
differences in living across Canada.®

Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Ministers Responsible for Social Services, The National Child Benefit:
2001 Progress Report, May 2002; available from< http://www.nationalchildbenefit.ca/ncb/NCB2002/toceng.html> Internet; accessed 20 October 2002.
®Ibid.
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Table 1.2

Low Income Cut-offs for Economic Families and

Size of Area of Residence
Family size

500,000
or more

100,000
to
499,999

30,000
to
99,999

Small
urban
regions

Rural
(farm and
non-farm)

1
2
3
4
5
6

18,371
22,964
28,560
34,572
38,646
42,719
46,793

15,757
19,697
24,497
29,653
33,148
36,642
40,137

15,648
19,561
24,326
29,448
32,917
36,387
39,857

14,561
18,201
22,635
27,401
30,629
33,857
37,085

12,696
15,870
19,738
23,892
26,708
29,524
32,340

74-

Source: Statistics Canada, Census 2001.

Causes of child poverty
The previous section reveals that poverty is not a concrete concept. Most countries
have difficulty agreeing on one measure of poverty, and therefore one meaning of
poverty. Without an income line to determine when an individual's or a family's income
is insufficient, one cannot determine poverty. Not surprisingly, there is also no consensus
about the causes of poverty or child poverty.
Three groups of factors are understood to play a role in child poverty. First, there are
the economic causes. Included in this group are high unemployment rates, recessions, a
low minimum wage, and the decline in the earning capacity of adults, particularly men,
with limited education.^ While periods of economic recovery usually lead to decreases in
poverty rates, in recent years, while the number of people in poverty declined, the
poverty gap (the amount by which the incomes of all poor people fell below the poverty
line) has not been decreasing significantly. The poverty gap reflects both the number of
®Eugene M. Lewit, “Why is Poverty Increasing Among Children?” The Future o f Children 3 no. 2
(Summer/Fall 1993) : 202.
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people who are poor and the depth of poverty. Because the poverty gap is based in part
on the number of people who are poor, it should shrink as the number of poor people
declines. This has happened, however, only to a limited degree in recent years because
those who are poor have become poorer. For example, in the United States, the poverty
gap in 2000 ($66.5 billion) was only one percent smaller than the $67.1 billion poverty
gap in 1995, despite the fact that the number of people in poverty was 13 percent lower in
2000 than in 1995.^®
Various studies have been performed on the link between unemployment rates and
child poverty rates. Employment alone is less likely today than in the past to promote
economic self-sufficiency. Nearly one in three poor family heads today are in the labor
force, a figure higher than that observed in 1980.“ Indeed the poverty rate among
working family heads is higher than those observed in the 80s. An analysis of data fi*om
41,996 children under the age of 18, living with at least one parent, fi*om the 1990 annual
demographic supplement of the Current Population Survey, undertook to study the
relationship between parental employment and child poverty. “ The investigators
surmised that since most men work, the population of non-working fathers who could
make the transition fi*om unemployment to employment was small. Therefore, they
concluded that paternal employment would have a modest effect on child poverty: If 10
percent of unemployed fathers became employed, the overall child poverty rate would
decline fi^om 9.7 percent to 9.5 percent, a decrease of 2 percent; if 50 percent and 90
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Poverty Rates Fell in 2000 as Unemployment Reached 31-year
Low: Upturn in Unemployment Combined with Weaknesses in Safety Net Raise Red Flags for 200f
September 2001, available from <http://www.cbpp.org> Internet; accessed 30 October 2002.
" Daniel T. Lichter and David J. Eggebeen, “The Efrect of Parental Employment on Child Poverty”,
Journal o f Marriage and the Family 65, no. 3 (August 1994) : 634.
D. Hollander, “Plausible Increase in Parental Employment Likely to Produce Only a Shght Decline in
Child Poverty”, Family Planning Perspectives 27 no. 2 (March-April) ; 88.
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percent began working, poverty rates would fall to 8.5 percent and 7.5 percent, drops of
12 percent and 23 percent respectively.^^
On the other hand, when nonworking mothers in a two-parent household make the
transition to employment, the effect is roughly doubled. For example, if 10 percent of
such mothers became employed, child poverty rates would decline by 4 percent; likewise,
if 50 percent or 90 percent of unemployed mothers entered the labor force, child poverty
would drop by 23 percent and 41 percent, respectively. In households headed by a
nonworking mother, if 10 percent became employed, child poverty fell by 5 percent; if 50
percent became employed, the child poverty rate would drop by 23 percent, and if 90
percent entered the labor force, the poverty would decline by 42 percent.

Evidently,

maternal employment has a greater effect on child poverty rates.
Researchers have concluded that only a substantial increase in maternal employment
would have an important effect on child poverty. However, it may not be realistic to
think that unemployed mothers will be able to find jobs that pay adequately in their skill
levels, and child care they can afford. Therefore, welfare policies that aim to “get people
working” will not eliminate child poverty unless the pay is sufficient to provide for basic
material needs of families and children.
The minimum wage debate is still hotly contested. Many opponents claim that
raising the minimum wage reduces employment and generates involuntary
unemployment.^^ Furthermore, those that would benefit from the minimum wage

Ibid.
Ibid., 89.
Ibid.
Saul D. Hofi&nan and Laurence S. Seidman, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Antipoverty Effectiveness
and Labor Market Effects (Kalamazoo: WE. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1990), 56.
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increase would be teenagers living with their parents. Other critics argue that raising the
minimum wage causes price increases, which in return increases inflation.

Proponents

disagree with these arguments, pointing to the last increase in the minimum wage in
1996-1997, where unemployment actually decreased, especially among groups most
affected by the minimum wage.'® In addition, wages have risen since the minimum wage
increase, but there has been no evidence of price pressures coming from those recent
wage gains.Therefore, proponents believe that modest increases in the minimum wage
will not generate job losses or price pressures.
The causes of poverty also double as solutions to the problem. However, economic
causes tend to be seen as a result of a free market and the government does not want to
interfere in this sphere. Yet, looking to economic recovery to cure poverty has yet to be
proven as a successful measure of poverty reduction. The jobs created are often not for
low-skilled workers.
The second group of factors that cause child poverty are family (and individual)
causes. Included in this category are erosion of family values, with high divorce rates
and high premarital birth rates, along with laziness, and lack of responsibility on the part
of the poor. In 1993, one-quarter of all children and two-thirds of black children were
bom out of wedlock.

Not surprisingly, the number of children living in single parent

households has increased significantly. Single-parent families, with the mother as the
head of the household, are much more likely to be poor than two-parent families because

Jared Bernstein and Cass Ballenger, “Would raising the Minimum Wage Help Alleviate Child Poverty?”,
The CQ Researcher 10 no. 13 (April 2000) ; 297.
Kathy Koch, “Child Poverty”, The CQ Researcher 10 no. 13 (April 2000) : 288.
Bernstein, “The Minimum Wage,” 297.
Lewit, “Poverty Increasing Among Children,” 202.
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single mothers’ earning power tends to be low, the absent father often fails to contribute
child support, and public benefits are in short supply. Even for those who are working,
average real earnings have not grown rapidly for many years and the distribution of
earnings has become more unequal than ever/^ Public policy in both the United States
and Canada has begun to reflect conservative assumptions. Programs such as AFDC
(Aid to Families with Dependent Children) in the United States and Social Assistance in
Canada were seen as establishing perverse incentives for beneficiaries to have babies
outside of marriage and not work. The belief was that welfare was so generous that it
made sense to stay on welfare and have more babies, rather than go to work. Both
governments have moved away from these programs, toward courses of action that
“encourage” work and family values.
Progressives point to the minimal amounts collected by beneficiaries of programs
such as AFDC and Social Assistance. The average monthly AFDC payment in its last
year of existence, accounting for inflation, had withered by almost 50 percent since 1970,
yet the birth rate for unmarried mothers soared during this period.^^ Furthermore, states
with low welfare benefits had higher illegitimacy rates than states with high welfare
benefits; in fact, New Jersey’s 1993 law that ended the practice of increasing a welfare
check when a recipient had another baby did not drive down birth rates among women on

Robert Plotnick, “Directions for Reducing Child Poverty”, Social Work 34 no. 6 ((November 1989) *
524.
D. Stanley Eitzen and Maxine Baca Zinn, “The Missing Safety Net and Famihes: a Progressive Critique
of the New Welfare Legislation”, Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 27 (March 2000) : 56.
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w elfare.Finally, much more generous welfare states in Western Europe and
Scandinavia have much lower out-of-wedlock birth rates than the United States.
The third group of factors is government causes. Included in this category are lack
of social spending, poor targeting, inefficiency in program administration, and prejudicial
public policy. Lack of social spending is seen as playing a large role in child poverty.
Children may be poor because their parents do not earn enough, however, there are no
adequate substitute sources of cash or services to meet the needs of children. Programs
such as AFDC, and now TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) or Social
Assistance do not meet the needs of the recipients. The amount of financial assistance
given to families is well below the poverty line. Additionally, government cutbacks, user
fees, minimum wage laws, and de-indexing of various benefits will continue to
exacerbate the rates of child poverty.^^ While in an ideal world, a healthy economy and
good jobs for parents would eliminate child poverty, in a world where there is unjust,
unequal, and discriminatory distribution of resources, the government must step in to
balance the needs and resources of various groups of people. Such compromise requires
economic and social policies, including redistribution of resources and opportunities,
which provide “a fair chance for all children” regardless of birth or luck.^^
Comparing the poverty statistics of those over 65 and of children, it is evident that
proper targeting of poverty groups by the government can have a large effect on the
poverty rate of the group. Both the United States and Canada have well-developed and

^Ibid.
Ibid.
^ Marge Reitsma-Slreet, “Three Perspectives on Child Poverty in Canada”, The Social Worker 61 no 1
(1998) : 8.
^Ibid.
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generous social security programs which lift 75 percent of the elderly out of poverty.
While children may not be as easy to target as the elderly, more could be done by the
governments to reduce child poverty, whether it be through cash or in-kind transfers
(Food Stamps, Headstart, or Medicaid).

Anti poverty programs in the United States
The United States’ antipoverty programs are of two types: social insurance and
means-tested transfers. Among each category are both cash and in-kind transfers. Social
Insurance programs have two distinguishing characteristics. They are universal and they
have dedicated funding mechanisms. All individuals and their employers make
contributions that finance the programs. All individuals can receive benefits when
specific eligibility requirements are met. Social Insurance taxes are disbursed to trust
funds from which benefits are paid. In the United States, the main social insurance
programs are Social Security, Medicare, Unemployment Insurance, Workers’
Compensation, and Disability Insurance. The largest social insurance program is Social
Security, which was established in 1935 to meet the needs of older workers. Over half of
Social Security benefits go to families whose pretax and pretransfer incomes identify
them as poor. In 1998, average benefits (including survivors’ benefits) were about
$9,600, while the poverty threshold for the elderly in 1998 was $7,818 for a single person
and $9,862 for a couple, the program has had a major effect in reducing poverty among
the elderly.
The next largest program. Medicare, began in 1967. It covers most individuals over
65 and most people under 65 who are receiving Social Security Disability benefits. In
John Karl Scholz and Kara Levine, “The evolution of income support policy in recent decades” Focus
21 No. 2 (FaU 2000) : 11.
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1998, per capita expenditure was $5,810.^® Over half of Medicare benefits go to families
whose pretransfer incomes are below the poverty line. The effect of Medicare on poverty
is more difficult to ascertain because it provides an in-kind benefit (medical care) and
insurance, rather than cash.
The elderly receive between 85 and 90 percent of all payments for Social Security
and Medicare. Three smaller programs target workers between the ages of 18 and 64;
Unemployment Insurance, Workers’ Compensation, and Disability Insurance
Unemployment Insurance (UI) is given to workers who become involuntarily
unemployed. It covers only one-third of job separations for less-skilled men and fewer
than 16 percent for less-skilled women. Therefore, it has a relatively minor effect on
poverty.
Workers’ Compensation and Disability Insurance (DI) are overshadowed by Social
Security; however, they are still large programs. In 1998, Workers’ Compensation
payments were $42.6 billion, and in 1999 DI payments were over 50 b illio n .L ittle is
known about their antipoverty effect.
While welfare programs have had declining budgets in the last decade, social
insurance programs have been growing. These programs are in harmony with societal
norms and values, unlike welfare programs, which are seen as creating dependence on the
system and eroding the family unit. Furthermore, social insurance programs do not have
explicit antipoverty objectives, rather it is an indirect result. While most individuals in
society would agree that the poor need some help, the extent to which they should be
helped is another matter.
^Ibid.
Ibid.
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Means-tested programs, on the other hand, have clear antipoverty intentions. The
largest means-tested program is Medicaid, which funds medical assistance to low-income
elderly, blind, and disabled individuals, to members of poor families with children under
age 18, and to some pregnant women and other children. More than 70 percent of all
Medicaid recipients had incomes below the poverty line in 1997. Fewer than ten percent
were 65 and older in 1995.^° Medicaid, just like Medicare, is difficult to assess as an
antipoverty program, as it is difficult to assign a value to a benefit that a person may not
use.
The other means-tested health related program is Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), a federally administered cash transfer program for elderly, blind, and disabled
individuals (the last group makes up 80 percent of all recipients). Between 1990 and
1994, the program’s costs rose 55 percent, making SSI one of the nation’s fastest growing
entitlement programs.
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was the largest cash transfer
means-tested program for non-working or working families. It was in existence from
1936 to 1996, at which time it was replaced by TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families). AFDC was a means-tested entitlement program. All applicants whose income
and assets were below state-stipulated levels could receive benefits. The federal
government provided matching fiinds. On the contrary, TANF is a set of block grants
given to states by the federal government, with few restrictions imposed upon them. The
three main “conditions” of receipt are that states have to spend at least 75 percent of their
“historic” level of AFDC spending, a five-year limit is imposed on the receipt of
Ibid.
Ibid., 12.
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federally supported assistance, and states have to meet certain targets in moving portions
of their TANF recipients into work activities.

Most states use the two-year

requirement, expecting recipients to participate in work activities within 24 months of
initial benefit receipt. States can exempt single mothers with children under the age of
one fi*om such requirements. States can also give exemptions to the time limit to 20
percent of their caseload, and are permitted to make payments beyond five years, using
their own funds.
The welfare caseload peaked in 1994 with a total of 14.2 million recipients (5V2
percent of the population).

However, the numbers have been declining since 1994, and

in March 1999, there were 7.3 million recipients of TANF, a 48 percent decline in the
number of recipients of cash assistance since the peak in 1994.^"^ The sharp reduction in
welfare spending has been roughly proportional to the decline in welfare caseloads
Under AFDC, states were required to disregard a portion of earned income, however, the
amount was limited and had a steep phase-out period. In the pre-TANF era, working
AFDC clients often lost one dollar in benefits for every dollar earned, effectively facing a
100 percent tax rate. Under TANF, many states have altered their earnings disregards to
encourage work. Connecticut disregards all earnings below poverty and California
disregards $225 of earnings and 50 percent of the remainder for an unlimited number of
months.

These changes reflect state priorities to make work pay, as well as one of the

main goals of PRWORA (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act): to end the

Ibid.
Pamela Loprcst, Stefanie Schmidt and Ann Diyden Witte, "Welfare Reform under PRWORA; Aid to
Children with Working Families?”, Tax Policy and the Economy 14 (2000) : 160
Ibid., 161.
Ibid., 166.
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dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
work, and marriage.
The other cash transfer program to able-bodied families is the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC). It is a refundable tax credit that began in 1975 to offset payroll taxes. It
encourages low-skilled workers to enter the labor market, since payments are linked to
earnings. Families who have no earnings receive nothing. Spending for the EITC has
increased dramatically over the last decade. In 1999, 19.5 million taxpayers benefited
from the EITC. Federal spending on the program exceeded spending on TANF and Food
Stamps combined by several billion dollars in 1999.
Two other tax-linked benefits exist to aid families. The personal exemption is
deducted from income, and is of use only to those who have earned enough to pay taxes,
that is, more than $7,000 in the year. Since the tax rate is higher for those with higher
incomes, the exemption is also worth more to those with higher incomes. Its maximum
cash value is about $1,000 per person. The Child Tax Credit is a federal benefit worth up
to $600 in 2001 for each dependent under age 17. In 2001, even families that earned too
little to pay income tax could get the credit. The credit is refundable and is in addition to
the Earned Income Tax Credit for anyone with a dependent under age 17 who earns more
than $10,000.^'^
The last category of means-tested antipoverty programs are the in-kind transfers.
The largest of these programs are Food Stamps, housing assistance. Head Start, and two
nutritional programs: school nutrition programs and the special supplemental program for

Ibid., 158.
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Facts About the Child Tax Credit: A Bigger Paycheck Boostfor
Many Families, available from <http://www.cbpp.org> Internet; accessed 21 October 2002.
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Women, Infants, and Children (WIG). The United States’ single, almost-universal
program for people with low income and assets is Food Stamps. Since 1994, real Food
Stamp expenditures fell 38.3 percent, a decline far steeper than the declines in overall
poverty rates or in child poverty.^^
Housing assistance has never been an entitlement. Eligibility is based on family
characteristics and income. Space is generally allotted on a first-come, first-served basis,
although preference is given to families that are homeless, living in substandard housing,
involuntarily displaced, or paying more than 50 percent in rent.
The other four programs are much smaller, and they have decreased slightly in the
last decade. The school programs are entitlement programs, while WIG and Head Start
are not.

Antipoverty programs In Canada
Antipoverty programs in Canada are very similar to that of the United States. They
are also divided in two categories: social insurance and means tested transfers. Social
insurance programs include Old Age Security, the Canada Pension Plan, Guaranteed
Income Supplement, Employment Insurance (formerly known as Unemployment
Insurance), and Workers’ Compensation (run by the provincial governments). Income
Security Programs for the elderly are divided in two levels.
The first level is Old Age Security. It is the cornerstone of Canada’s retirement
income system. It includes a basic monthly pension that is received by almost all people
65 or older who have lived in Canada for at least 10 years. An applicant’s employment
history is not a factor in determining eligibility, nor does the applicant need to be retired.
Scholz, “Evolution of Income Support”, 12.
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Old Age Security pensioners pay federal and provincial income tax. Higher income
pensioners also repay part or all of their benefits through the tax system. For those
receiving Old Age Security who have little or no other income, there is the Guaranteed
Income Supplement. It is determined through the filing of an income statement on a
yearly basis; unlike Old Age Security, it is not subject to income tax. Allowances are
also available for surviving spouses.
The second level of income security, the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), is a monthly
retirement pension to people who have worked and contributed to the CPP It also acts as
an insurance plan, supplying disability and survivor benefits for those who qualify. It
provides a monthly income to individuals and their families who have been severely
disabled during their working years. It also offers a monthly income to surviving
spouses, or children.
Employment Insurance and health care are the two remaining social insurance
programs. Canada provides universal coverage without any point-of-service charges for
essential medical services through its national health care system, commonly known as
medicare. Provincial governments administer and fund the system, with the federal
government providing some financing to the provinces. However, the medicare system is
not comprehensive. Prescription drugs, dental care, and eyeglasses, are not covered
under Canada’s health care plan. Employment Insurance is also available, yet, its’ role as
an antipoverty program is limited.^^ The number of workers eligible for El has dropped

Ken Battle, Michael Mendelson, Daniel Meyer, Jane Millar, and Peter Whiteford, Benefitsfor Children:
A Four Country Stutfy, (Ottawa: Renouf Publishing Company Limited, 2001), III.
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dramatically in the past ten years. Only one-third of unemployed workers in Canada
currently receive benefits under the program.
In Canada, federal and provincial governments share equal power over most meanstested antipoverty programs. The largest anti-child poverty program is the Canada Child
Tax Benefit introduced in 1993, but reconfigured in 1998. It has a two-tier structure: the
Child Tax Benefit (CTB) and the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS). The CTB
is broadly targeted, encompassing 80 percent of families, while the NCBS is for lowincome families only."*^ It is in addition to the basic benefit. Under the 1998 National
Child Benefit reforms, provincial and territorial governments are expected (though not
required) to reduce their existing social assistance expenditures on behalf of children to
take into account these increasing federal expenditures. If they do, they must reinvest
such savings in other programs and services for low-income families with children.
Previous provincial social assistance benefits for children were essentially programs of
last resort, available only to those who had exhausted all other sources of income, in
other words, '"welfare" as understood in the United States. All provinces and territories,
except Prince Edward Island, now offer income-tested child benefit programs and/or
earnings supplements for families with children, most created under the National Child
Benefit reform. The fully integrated child benefit program has replaced most social
assistance payments on behalf of children.
The federal government had established the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) in 1966.
It was an entitlement program for adults who had exhausted all other sources of income.

^ Battle, “The Post-Welfare State in Canada”, 10.
Battle, “Benefits for Children”, 101.
Ibid., 105.
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Under CAP, provinces were required to pay financial aid to applicants who qualified on
the basis of need. This meant that their liquid assets (cash, bonds) had to fall below
certain levels. In certain provinces, the value of their fixed assets (house, car) could not
exceed designated levels, and their available income had to be insufficient to meet their
basic and/or special needs (health or disability-related conditions). However, two federal
actions in the 1990s put an end to CAP In 1990, the federal government announced a
cap on CAP, and the 1995 federal budget introduced the Canada Health and Social
Transfer (CHST), which completely replaced CAP and the Established Programs
Financing arrangement for health and postsecondary education, with a single block fund
for health, post-secondary education, welfare and social services/^ With the new funding
system, there is no guarantee that the funds will be spent on welfare and social services
objectives, as there is no cost-sharing intended explicitly for welfare and social services.
The death of CAP means that the protections inherent in the legislation will be lost.
Welfare is no longer an entitlement program in Canada. The loss of CAP invariably
implies that provinces will be free to provide financial assistance to whichever
“deserving” applicants they choose."^
Adults who have exhausted all other means of income may still qualify for social
assistance (welfare) by undergoing income and assets test, through monthly monitoring
of their situation; however, most provinces are actively seeking ways to keep individuals
off welfare or to move them out quickly once they are in the system. Most provinces

Sherri Toijman, Workfare: A Poor Law^ Februaiy 1996, available from< http://www.caledoninst.org/>
Internet; accessed 26 November 2002, p. 3.
^ Ibid., 4.
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have “workfare” programs, which require individuals to participate in a planning process
to discuss their training and employment options.
In-kind means-tested transfers are limited in Canada. Only about ten percent of
children aged zero to twelve occupy a provincial government-regulated child care space,
and of these, only 31 percent receive a targeted-to-the-poor government subsidy.
However, there is a child care expense deduction, but it only partly compensates for
families’ outlays on child care. Social housing is also available to the poor, but there are
long waiting lists and the supply is shrinking. Canada has no US-style Food Stamp
program.
Looking at the direction which both countries seem to have taken in the last
decade, it appears that tax-linked benefits seem to be the preferred method to fight child
poverty. Both the United States and Canada have expanded and funded more generously
their tax-linked benefits for families and their children. Both countries are attempting to
retreat from traditional forms of welfare entitlement programs and progress toward
programs that reward work and promote independence and responsibility in recipients.

Battle, “Benefits for Children”, 109.
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Chapter 2
The United States’ Earned income Tax Credit and the
Canada Chiid Tax Benefit
The history of the Earned Income Tax Credit
The United States became preoccupied with poverty in the early 1960s. President
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society singled out poverty as the social crisis of the 1960s.
While some argued for entitlement-oriented guaranteed annual incomes (GAIs), the
loudest voices called for work-oriented programs. An anti-welfare, pro-work attitude
pervaded the national culture. It emphasized work over dependency, distinguishing
between poverty (which was seen as a temporary condition of the working poor and a
permanent condition of the disabled and aged) and welfare dependency (which was seen
as a pathological and voluntary condition of the indolent).'*^ The development of this
national sentiment was not recent. In 1937, for instance, with the nation immersed in a
protracted depression and with millions of Americans without jobs, public opinion
favored “work relief’ over “cash relief’ by a nine-to-one margin.

Even during the

Depression, Americans supported work-relief over cash-relief programs.
The Johnson administration set out to eliminate barriers that precluded individuals
from becoming self-sufficient. The tax system was perceived as an obstacle to lowincome earners. Policymakers realized that traditional means of tax reforms (reducing
positive tax rates or raising personal exemptions) would not help low-income individuals
who did not owe federal income tax. Reformers recognized that tax laws had to be
Dennis J. Ventiy, Jr., “The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The PoUtical History of the Earned
Income Tax Credit, 1969-1999”, National Tax Journal 53 No. 4 (December 2000) : 4.
Ibid., 4.
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modified in order to pay benefits directly to the needy. They put together a plan for a
negative income tax (NIT).
The NIT would apply negative rates per capita credit. The NIT
would reduce administrative cost by displacing social workers and
would encourage individuals once out of poverty to earn their way
toward self-sufficiency by using fractional marginal tax rates (50
percent), rather than 100 percent marginal tax rates on earnings such
as done by traditional welfare programs. However, the NIT had one
crucial flaw. It paid out the maximum credit to nonworking
households and was likely to act as a work disincentive. Even
Johnson opposed the NIT."^^
In 1969, Nixon promoted the NIT in his Family Assistance Plan (FAP). The plan
proposed to replace the AFDC program with a standardized national payment, which
states could supplement if they desired. Through the use of an income disregard,
fractional phase-outs, and a requirement that all recipients either maintain employment or
seek work, FAP would reverse the rising welfare rolls. By 1970, nine million people
received AFDC/*^ However, opponents to Nixon’s FAP program were quick to surface.
Most liberals felt that the FAP was inadequate to aid those in need. Conservatives, on the
other hand, deemed it lacking in work requirements and compared it to a cash giveaway.
Furthermore, FAP costs would exceed those of existing public assistance programs by
two billion dollars.

While FAP was eventually defeated, the proposal for a work bonus

gained popularity among the public.
The first work supplement was introduced by President Ford in the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975.^' The credit was called the Earned Income Credit (EITC). Section 32 of the

^ Ibid., 5.

^^Ibid., 8.
Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 17.
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Internal Revenue Code established (for one year) a refundable credit for taxpayers with
incomes below $8,000. The ETC equaled ten percent of the first $4,000 of earned
income, or $400. It also phased out at ten percent, and disappeared entirely at $8,000.
The goals of the EITC were to encourage people to obtain employment, reduce the
unemployment rate and the welfare rolls, and to offset payroll tax burdens for lowincome families.The benefits were awarded only to working poor families with
children. The EITC cost only $1.25 billion.While the credit might play a role in
reducing welfare dependency, it was unlikely to reduce poverty.
In 1978, the EITC became a permanent provision of the Internal Revenue Code.
While the EITC still phased in at 10 percent, it now increased until $5,000 and conferred
a maximum benefit of $500 between $5,000-$6,000. The phase-out rate was 12.5
percent, which zeroed out at $10,000.^"^ The expansion of the credit restored its original
value, which had eroded due to inflation.
In 1984, the Deficit Reduction Act raised the maximum benefit to $550, as well as
the length of the stationary range by $500, and the maximum income to $11,000.^^
Despite the growth in benefits, inflation persisted in eroding the real value of the EITC.
These changes may seem unimpressive to liberals, but during a period known for its
cutbacks, any program expansion is remarkable. The 1981 OBRA cut federal and state
welfare expenditures by four billion dollars, reducing funding by 17.4 percent.
Between 1975 and 1984, the EITC’s maximum credit decreased by 35 percent in real
terms. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 offset this erosion and raised the maximum benefit
Ibid.
Ibid., 18.
^Ibid.
Ibid., 26.
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to $1,174. TRA 86 increased the phase-out point to $21,287. Furthermore, TRA 86
guaranteed future indexing for inflation.
Both OBRA 1990 and 1993 expanded the EITC’s maximum benefit and phase-out
rates, while OBRA 93 also raised the breakeven point. OBRA (Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act) 1990 introduced different credit rates to reflect family size (one and
two or more qualifying children) and enacted auxiliary credits for children under age one
(the so-called “wee tots” credit) and for health insurance paid on behalf of a qualifying
child. These auxiliary credits were retracted by OBRA 1993. However, the 1993 law
provided substantial increases in the credit rate and the maximum credit for families with
children. In particular, the 1993 OBRA increased the credit rate for families with two or
more children and extended the benefits to childless taxpayers between the ages of 25 and
64.^^ The changes produced by the 1990 and 1993 bills caused the EITC to triple in size,
jumping from $7.5 billion in 1990 to $21.1 billion in 1994. As a result of the changes in
1990 and 1993, the EITC became the largest cash-benefit program provided to lowincome families with children. Between 1986 and 1996, EITC expenditures grew by
1,191 percent. In 2001, beneficiaries of the EITC were four times as great as the number
of those receiving TANF at a cost of $26 billion.

What is the Earned Income Tax Credit and how does It work?
The EITC is an income-transfer program that operates through the tax system to
provide an income grant to low-income working households with children. If the amount
of the credit exceeds the taxpayer’s federal income liability, the excess is refundable to
Ibid., 27.
Rebecca Y. Kim, “The Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Children's Income and Poverty; Who
Fares Better?”, Journal o f Poverty 5 no. 1 (2001) : 3
^®Ibid., 2.
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the taxpayer as a direct transfer payment. For example, if a household’s tax would have
been $450 but their EITC credit is $300, then the household pays only $150 in tax.
Furthermore, if the household owes $450 in tax, but their EITC credit is $800, then the
household receives a tax refund of $350 from the 1RS. The credit has several important
purposes: to reduce the tax burden of low- and moderate-income workers, to supplement
wages, and to make work more attractive than welfare.
Single or married people who work fiill-time or part-time can qualify for the EITC,
depending on their income. Both families and childless workers are eligible for the
EITC Qualifying children must be under age 19, or under 24 if they are full-time
students. Totally and permanently disabled children of any age may also be “qualifying
children”. The relationship test requires that the child be the child, adopted child,
stepchild, grandchild, or foster child of the taxpayer. The residency test requires that the
child live with the taxpayer for more than half of the taxable year. Workers without
children between the ages of 25 and 64, and who had earnings below $10,710 were
eligible for the credit in 2001. The EITC is based on the household’s total income, not
the individual’s. The credit is restricted to households with labor earnings. Income from
programs such as TANF do not count toward EITC Earnings.
The EITC is available to low-income working taxpayers with three separate
schedules based on the level of income. The credit amount generally equals a specified
percentage of the earned income up to a certain income level, called the “phase-in range.”
The maximum credit applies to a certain income range “stationary range” and then
gradually decreases to zero over a specified “phase-out range.”
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Figure 2.1 shows the actual EITC schedule for 1997 for households with one
qualifying child. If the household’s earnings were zero, its credit was zero. When the
household earns its first $100, it receives a credit of $34; it continues to receive $34 for
each additional $100 of earnings until earnings reach $6,500 and the credit reaches
$2,210 (34 percent of $6,500). There is a stationary range from $6,500 to $11,930 where
the credit remains $2,210. The phase-out begins at $11,930. The phase-out rate is 15.98
percent; for each additional $100 of earnings, the credit is reduced by $15.98. Since the
maximum credit is $2,210, it takes $13,820 of additional earnings to completely phase
out the credit. This occurs at £=$25,750 (11,930 + 13,820=25,750).
ms;: s.!

EITC schedule

$11,930

$25,750

Note; Saul D. Hoffinan and Laurence S. Seidman, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Antipoverty
Effectiveness and Labor Market Effects (Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, 1990), 10.
* Author has changed the calculations to 1997 rather than 1990.

Figure 2.2 shows the actual EITC schedule for 1997 for households with two
qualifying children. If the household’s earnings were zero, its credit was zero. When the
household earns its first $100, it receives a credit of $40; it continues to receive $40 for
each additional $100 of earnings until earnings reach $9,140 and the credit reaches
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$3,656 (40 percent of $9,140). There is a stationary range from $9,140 to $11,930 where
the credit remains $3,656. The phase-out begins at $11,930. The phase-out rate is 21.06
percent; for each additional $100 of earnings, the credit is reduced by $21.06. Since the
maximum credit is $3,656, it takes $17,360 of additional earnings to completely phase
out the credit. This occurs at E=$29,290 (11,930 + 17,360=29,290).

Note: Saul D. Hoffinan and Laurence S. Seidman, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Antipoverty
Ejfectiveness and Labor Market Effects (Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, 1990), 12.
* Author has changed the calculations to 1997 rather than 1990.

The phase-in EITC depends on a family’s earned income, while the phase-out
depends on either earned income or adjusted gross income (whichever is greater).
Adjusted gross income (AGI), as defined by the U.S. tax code, equals labor income plus
capital income (property income such as interest, dividends, capital gains, or rental
income) plus several items such as unemployment compensation, minus several items
such as individual retirement account deductions. Although a households’ AGI is usually
larger than its labor income, it is possible for it to be smaller due to the items that are
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Table 2.1

E a rned Income Tax Credit Parameters,

Credit
C alendar year
(percent)

Beginning Income

Ending Income

$400

10.00

$4,000

$8,000

1979-84

10.00

$5,000

$500

12.50

$6,000

$10,000

1985-86

14.00

$5,000

$550

12.22

$6,500

$11,000

1987

14.00

$6,080

$851

10.00

$6,920

$15,432

1988

14.00

$6,240

$874

10.00

$9,840

$18,576

1989

14.00

$6,500

$910

10.00

$10,240

$19,340

1990

14.00

$6,810

$953

10.00

$10,730

$20,264

16.70

$7,140

$1,192

11.93

$11,250

$21,250

17.30

$7,140

$1,235

12.36

$11,250

$21,250

17.60

$7,520

$1,324

12.57

$11,840

$22,370

18.40

$7,520

$1,384

13.14

$11,840

$22,370

18.50

$7,750

$1,434

13.21

$12,200

$23,050

19.50

$7,750

$1,511

13.93

$12,200

$23,050

7.65
26.30
30.00

$4,000
$7,750
$8,425

$306
$2,038
$2,528

7.65
15.98
17.68

$5,000
$11,000
$11,000

$9,000
$23,755
$25,296

7.65
34.00
34.00

$4,100
$6,160
$8,640

$314
$2,094
$3,110

7.65
15.98
20.22

$5,130
$11,290
$11,290

$9,230
$24,396
$26,673

7.65
34.00
40.00

$4,220
$6,330
$8,890

$323
$2,152
$3,556

7.65
15.98
21.06

$5,280
$11,610
$11,610

$9,500
$25,078
$28,495

7.65
34.00
40.00

$4,340
$6,500
$9,140

$332
$2,210
$3,656

7.65
15.98
21.06

$5,430
$11,930
$11,930

$9,770
$25,750
$29,290

7.65
34.00
40.00

$4,530
$6,800
$9,540

$347
$2,312
$3,816

7.65
15.98
21.06

$5,670
$12,460
$12,460

$10,200
$26,928
$30,580

1992
One Child
Two C hildren

•
•

1993
O ne Child
Two C liildren

•
•
•

1994
N o C hildren
One Child
Two C hildren

•
•
•

M axim um
Credit

Phase-out
Rate
(percent)

$4,000

•
•

•
•
•

Phase-out R ange

M inim um
Incom e for
M axim um
Credit

10.00

1991
One Child
Two C hildren

•
•
•

[Dollar amounts

1975-78

•
•

•
•
•

1975-97

1995
No C hildren
O ne Child
Two Children
1996
N o C hildren
One Child
Two C hildren
1997
No C hildren
One Child
T wo C hildren
1999*
N o C hildren
O ne Child
Two C hildren

Source: U.S. Congress (1998), Green Book (p. 867)
♦Data for the year 1999 collected from the Internal Revenue Service 1999.
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subtracted in computing AGl/^ An increase in other income can render a family
ineligible for the EITC even if the level of earned income falls within the phase-out
range. The reason for the phase-in by labor earnings and phase-out by adjusted gross
income or labor earnings is simply that the EITC’s purpose is to encourage work and
reward work effort. The phase-in must therefore be based on labor earnings.
Households must file a tax return to receive their EITC credit. Many eligible
households do not file an income tax return because households with low-incomes are not
legally required to file a federal income tax return. For example, in 2002, a single
individual under 65 did not have to file if her gross income was less than $7,700, a head
of household under 65 did not have to file if she earned less than $9,900, a married
couple (both spouses under 65) filing jointly did not have to file if they earned less than
$13,850.^' Undoubtedly, there are households who are eligible for the EITC that do not
receive the credit to which they are entitled. In theory, the household does not need to
wait until its 1040 return is processed to receive its credit. An advance payment option is
available through employers for workers with at least one qualifying child. Childless
workers are not eligible for the advance payment option. The credit can be received with
each paycheck. In practice, only a small amount of households receive the credit through
advance payment.

The history of the Canada Child Tax Benefit
In Canada, the major reforms to federal child benefits can be divided into four
phases; regressive targeting, untargeted universality, progressive universality, and
Hoffinan, The Earned Income Tax Credit, 14.
^Ibid., 15.
Department of the Treasury, Exemptions, Standard Deduction, and Filing Information, 2002, available
from <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfrp501.pdf> Internet; accessed 26 November 2002.
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progressive targeting. The long-term trend has been toward greater “targeting,”
signifying focusing child benefits on need as measured by family income.^^ Child benefit
programs in Canada have tried to meet two broad objectives: horizontal equity and anti
poverty. Horizontal equity acknowledges that parents have a heavier financial burden
than childless couples and single individuals with similar incomes. This objective also
appreciates the contribution that parents make to society by raising future citizens,
workers and taxpayers. The anti-poverty objective is founded on the moral principle that
societies should aid those in need. Since the late 1970s, the anti-poverty objective has
become more important than the horizontal equity objective.
The first tax-transfer benefit introduced was the children’s tax exemption
(temporarily changed to a non-refundable credit fi'om 1942 to 1946). It delivered its
benefits through regressive methods (regressive targeting). The higher the income tax
bracket, the larger the income tax saving, as children’s tax exemptions reduce taxable
income. Families which did not owe income tax (the majority, in those days) did not
benefit fi*om the children’s tax exemption.
In 1945, the Family Allowances was introduced. It was a non-taxable monthly cash
payment to all mothers on behalf of their children. Family Allowances was the first
universal child benefit program in Canada. It allowed poor families to finally benefit
fi-om the federal child benefit system. However, low-income families ineligible for the
children’s tax exemption received smaller total child benefits than did non-poor families.

Ken Battle and Michael Mendelson, Child Benefit Reform in Canada: an evaluative Jramework and
future directions, November 1997, available from< http://www.caledoninst.org/cbr-2.htm> Internet;
accessed 26 November 2002.
Ibid.
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While all families gained from the new universal system, benefits were still nonresponsive to need as measured by income,^"* in the untargeted universality phase.
In the 1970s, child benefits were increased extensively. In 1973, Family Allowances
were tripled and fully indexed to the cost of living. Furthermore, they became taxable,
which made them “progressive” since their value decreased as incomes increased. The
system began to respond more positively to income. Nevertheless, the taxability of
Family Allowances was offset by the children’s tax exemption. However, in 1978, the
federal government established a new child benefit program, the refundable Child Tax
Credit, which bestowed its maximum benefit upon low-income families. The refundable
Child Tax Credit was also indexed to the cost of living. For the first time, the income tax
system was used to deliver benefits to families too poor to owe income tax.^^
Even with the changes in the Family Allowance and the launching of the refundable
Child Tax Credit, which substantially increased benefits to lower-income families, the
distribution of child benefits remained skewed, the well-off families receiving larger
credits. Families earning $50,000 received more child benefits than families earning
$15,000 or less. In 1984, the final year of the progressive universality phase of federal
child benefits, a two-eamer family, earning $100,000, with two children, received $1,515
worth of child benefits, while a family earning $10,000 received $2,197 in child benefits
- only $682 more than the family with ten times as much earned income.^^
The fourth phase, progressive targeting, was launched in the 1980s. In 1988, the
children’s tax exemption was converted into a non-refundable Child Tax Credit. While

^Ibid.
Ibid.
^Ibid.
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the children’s tax exemption had been a regressive social program, providing higher
benefits to those with higher incomes, the non-refundable Child Credit provided
taxpayers with identical income tax savings. However, the non-refundable Child Tax
Credit had two major flaws: it did not provide benefits to those who had no income tax
liability and those who had income tax liability lower than the value of the credit could
not receive the maximum amount. The equivalent-to-married exemption (a benefit paid
on behalf of the first child in single-parent families) was also converted to a nonrefundable credit. In 1985, the federal child benefit system, which had been fiilly
indexed since 1973, was partially deindexed.^^
In 1991, universal child benefits were eliminated. Upper-income families were
required to repay all of their Family Allowances by means of a clawback administered
through the income tax system. The measure was phased in over a three-year period,
between 1989 and 1991, one-third each year As of 1991, well-off families received what
amounted to temporary Family Allowances since they had to pay the allowance back
through the clawback at income tax time.^^
In 1993, the three major federal child benefits program (Family Allowances, the
refundable Child Tax Credit and the non-refundable Child Tax Credit) were replaced by a
single income-tested Child Tax Benefit. The new benefit increased payments to working
poor families with children (by paying a Working Income Supplement), maintained the
level of benefits to other low-income families, reduced benefits for middle-income
families and removed benefits from upper-income families. In 1998, the Child Tax
Benefit was restructured under the National Child Benefit (NCB) reform into the Canada
Ibid.
^Ibid.
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Child Tax Benefit, which provided equal federal payments to all low-income families
with children. The NCB reform allowed provinces to reinvest their savings from reduced
provincial welfare expenditures on behalf of children (resulting from increased federal
child benefits) in other provincial income programs or social services for low-income
families with children.^^

What is the Canada Child Tax Benefit and how does it work?
The Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) is a direct non-taxable payment by the
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency to households with children. The CCTB was
introduced in 1998 under the National Child Benefit (NCB) reform. Through the
National Child Benefit, the federal government redesigned and enriched the Child Tax
Benefit (renamed the Canada Child Tax Benefit) by adding the National Child Benefit
Supplement (NCBS)
The Canada Child Tax Benefit has a two-tiered structure. The first tier of the CCTB,
the “basic Child Tax Benefit” (CTB), is an income-tested benefit payable to low to upper
middle-income families. In contrast, the National Child Benefit Supplement is paid
exclusively to low-income families. In addition, under the NCB, provinces are allowed
to reduce their welfare-provided child benefits by the amount of the federal child benefit
increase, provided they reinvest the resulting savings in other programs and services for
low-income families with children. The programs and services can be income-tested
child benefits, earnings supplements, child care, employment programs, and extension of
in-kind benefits to the other low-income families. The amount of the federal child
benefit increase is the amount that the federal government spends on the National Child
Ibid.
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Benefit Supplement. The objective of the National Child Benefit reform is to raise the
Canada Child Tax Benefit to the point where it displaces welfare-delivered child benefits.
To be eligible for the CCTB and the NCBS, the child must live with the claimant and
the latter must be the person who is primarily responsible for the care and upbringing of
the child. Individuals must file income tax returns to be entitled to the Canada Child Tax
Benefit and the National Child Benefit Supplement, even if they have no income to
report, as well as a one-time CCTB application.
Figure 2,3

Hov does the National Child Benefit Work?
N B tio ral Child B cn cfrt InW ath
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S o u r c e : The National Child Benefit Website.

The benefits described below are for the 12-month payment period July 2001- June
2002 (the payment year is from July 1 of one year to June 30 the next year). The first tier
of the Canada Child Tax Benefit, the basic child tax benefit, paid a maximum $1,117 per
child under age 18 per year from July 2001 through June 2002, delivered on a monthly
basis. In addition, there was a small ($77 per year) supplement for larger families (for the
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Table 2.2

Canada Child Tax Benefit

Basic B enefit
Supplem ent for 3"* and follow ing child

(CCTB) payment amounts.

July 1998 July 1999 July 2000 July 2001 July 2002
$1,151
51,117
51,104
SI,020
51,020
$80
578
577
S75
575
525,921

$219
530,004

5221
532,000

5228
532,960

2,5%
5.0%

2.5%
5%

2.5%
5%

2.5%
5%

5605
405
330

5785
585
510

$977
771
694

51,255
1,055
980

51,293
1,087
1,009

520,921

520,921

$21,214

521,744

$22,397

12.1%
20.2%
26.8%

11.5%
20%
27.5%

11.1%
19.9%
27.8%

12.2%
22.5%
32.1%

12.2%
22.5%
32.1%

Supplem ent for children under age seven
Base T hreshold

S213

5213

525,921

B enefit R eduction Rates

2.5%
5.0%

(NCBS) am ount for

NCBS Threshold
NCBS P hase-O ut Rate

-one child
-two or more children
-first child
-second child
-each additional child
-one child
-two children
-three or more children

Source: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency

third and each additional child) and up to $220 per year for each child under age seven
for whom the child care expenses deduction (a tax benefit for families with receipted
child care) were not claimed. Provinces can vary the rates according to the age and/or
number of children.
Maximum payments went to families with net incomes under $32,000 and were
reduced gradually above this level at the rate of 2.5 percent for families with one child
and five percent for those with two or more children. Eligibility for benefits ended at
relatively high incomes - $76,680 in net income for families with one or two children.
Because the Canada Child Tax Benefit calculates its payment on the basis of net family
income, a definition that allows substantial deductions (child care expenses, private
pension savings), families with gross incomes thousands of dollars above $76,680 net
family income level, where eligibility for benefits ends, still qualified for some payment.

70

Battle, “Benefits for Children”, 100.
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Thus, the Canada Child Tax Benefit is a broad based social program that serves eight in
ten families with children, excluding only the well off
The second tier is called the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS). It is
received by low-income families only. For the 12-month period July 2001-June 2002,
the National Child Benefit Supplement paid a maximum $1,255 for the first child, $1,055
for the second child and $980 for each additional child, phasing out above net family
income of $21,744 at the rate of 11.1 percent for one child, 19.9 percent for two children
and 27.8 percent for larger families, to end once net family income reached $32,000 for
families with one, two or three children (not coincidentally, the same level where the
basic Child Tax Benefit begins to reduce its payments). Together, the basic Child Tax
Benefit and the National Child Benefit Supplement amounted to a maximum annual
Canada Child Tax Benefit of $2,372 for one child, $2,172 for the second child and
$2,175 for each additional child.
For children in institutional care, a Children’s Special Allowance is paid to the
federal or provincial government department, child care agency or institution supporting
that child. The payment also may be made to foster parents. The Children’s Special
Allowance paid the same amount as the maximum Canada Child Tax Benefit for one
child - for July 2001-June 2002, $2,372 per year.^^
Families with net incomes between $21,744 and $32,000 in 2000 qualified for the
maximum basic CCTB and part of the NCBS However, families with net incomes
between $32,000 and $76,000 in 2000 only qualified for part of the basic CCTB

Ibid., 101.
Ibid., 101.
Ibid., 102.
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Furthermore, there was an additional supplement of $221 per year ($18.41 per month)
provided for each child less than seven years of age for whom no child care expenses
were claimed. The Alberta government is the only provincial government which has
chosen to vary the amount of basic benefit its residents receive. The basic benefit for
Albertans in 2002 was $1025 for children under seven, $1095 for children seven to
eleven, $1225 for children twelve to fifteen, and $1297 for children sixteen and
seventeen, plus and additional supplement of $78 per year for the third and each
additional child.
Table 2.3

Annual M aximum CCTB (including the NCBS) for the July 2001 to June

Number of Children
1“ Child
2"" Child
3"* and each additional child

Basic CCTB
$1117
$1117
$1195

NCBS
$1255
$1055
$980

Total
$2372
$2172
$2175

Source: National Chüd Benefit Website.
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70

80

Monthly Benefit
$197.66
$181.00
$181.25

The 2000 budget announced several significant changes to the CCTB. Foremost,
among them was the restoration of full indexation of the CCTB and the personal income
tax system’s tax brackets and credits to the 2000 cost of living. This is a significant
change for both child benefits and the income tax system (including its various childrelated benefits) as both systems had been eroded steadily for a decade and a half by
partial deindexation. The Canada Child Tax Benefit’s rates and income thresholds were
adjusted by the amount of inflation over three percent a year, which in real terms meant
that they fell by three percent if inflation ran over three percent or by the amount of
inflation if the latter was under three percent. The same held for the personal income tax
system’s tax brackets and credits.
The 2000 budget also announced increases to the CCTB’s rates and income
thresholds (for both the Basic Child Tax Benefit and the National Child Benefit
Supplement). Moreover, the reduction rate on the BCTB would be lowered in the future
(from two and a half percent to two percent for one child and from five to four percent for
two or more children by 2004). By July 2004, the maximum annual Canada Child Tax
Benefit was slated to reach $2,520 for the first child, $2,308 for the second child, and
$2,311 for each additional child.

A comparison of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Canada Child
Tax Benefit
After having reviewed the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Canada Child Tax
Benefit individually, a comparison of their similarities and differences is required before
moving on to the study of their anti-child poverty effectiveness. Each country’s culture
Ibid., 102.
Ibid., 103.
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has favored the implementation of programs which reward work and family values.
Canada's European ties had made it a more socially generous country in the past,
however, the current poverty rates of both countries, viewed in a cross-national
perspective, reveal that Canada is headed in the same direction as the United States. Both
countries have significantly reduced their spending on welfare programs, in an effort to
establish programs which encourage work and keep the family unit intact. Neither the
United States nor Canada possesses entitlement cash-assistance programs. While the
elderly and the disable still benefit from generous income security programs, because
they are societies’ “deserving” poor, the unemployed poor is not as lucky. Children
benefit from more programs than adults; however, significant increases in spending must
be recorded in each country before child poverty rates are lowered to an “acceptable”
level. Yet, targeting children through anti-poverty programs is problematic, as parents do
not necessarily have the child’s best interest at heart. Cash transfers may not be spent on
the needs of the child, and even in-kind transfers do not always get used adequately.
The EITC and the CCTB have become vital cash-transfer programs for children in
need. While the EITC has three phases (phase-in range, stationary range, and phase-out
range), the CCTB has only two phases (stationary range and phase-out range). In the
United States, the EITC is only available to those with labor earnings, unlike in Canada,
where “welfare” recipients can count their social assistance payments as income.
Moreover, the EITC is received by recipients on a yearly basis, and therefore is not as
responsive to the monthly needs of households. The CCTB, however, is received on a
monthly basis, and consequently is more reactive to the needs of low-income families.
Both programs calculate their benefits on a yearly basis, making their program
45

unresponsive to the changes of families in need. However, in Canada, when parents
separate or a spouse dies, the credit may be amended within a few weeks, but changes in
income can take up to eighteen months to be reflected in the credit. In the United States,
amendments are not made until the following tax year. While advance payment is
available in the United States, less than ten percent of EITC recipients take advantage of
this delivery method, as claimants have to refund any excess EITC that they receive since
it is merely an estimate and not the actual credit amount.
Both programs manifest signs of predicaments inherent to tax-transfer benefits.
Recipients must file an income tax return to be eligible for the EITC and the CCTB. In
both countries, personal exemptions exist for individuals who do not earn enough
income. They do not have to file taxes if they earn less than a certain amount. In
addition, each program requires separate forms to be filed along with the income tax
return. The process is somewhat confusing and could be simplified.
The CCTB is a more expansive program as it is claimed by eighty percent of families
in Canada. The EITC is not as far-reaching as the CCTB Canada’s child benefit system
attempts to fight not only child poverty, but also to achieve horizontal equity. While the
second-tier of the CCTB, the NCBS, targets exclusively low-income families, the firsttier, the CTB, targets 80 percent of families, even some families earning above $80,000.
Since the CCTB aims to remedy horizontal equity, the phase out rates for the basic tier
are fairly low (two and a half percent and five percent). However, the second tier has
higher phase-out rates, similar to that of the EITC, as the second level is comparable to
the EITC
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The CCTB is also more responsive to the needs of larger families, supplementing the
benefits of families with more than two children, unlike the EITC, which only
differentiates between families with one and two or more children. Adjusting credits by
family size is a controversial issue, as the government does not want to be perceived as
creating incentives for poor families to have more children. Furthermore, both the EITC
and the CCTB could be expanded in terms of credit amounts to have a more significant
effect upon low-income families
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Chapter 3
The anti-child poverty effectiveness of the Earned
income Tax Credit and the Canada Child Tax Benefit
The costs of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Canada Child Tax
Benefit
One of the advantages of the EITC and the CCTB is that they have relatively low
administrative costs compared to other anti-poverty programs of the same stature. Using
the tax system, rather than the welfare system to transfer income has the potential to
greatly reduce administrative costs because caseworkers are not required to administer
the program. The administrative costs of AFDC in 1995 were 16 percent of benefits
paid, in large part because of the need to pay for caseworkers.^^ By relying on taxpayers
to self-report on their tax returns, the EITC avoids this cost. Furthermore, tax-transfer
programs are usually based on income tax returns, which would have to be processed
regardless of the extra benefit program, therefore they do not usually add much work or
costs. The majority of EITC recipients would have to file a tax return even in the absence
of the credit; consequently, the marginal costs of the EITC are simply the small costs of
filling out Schedule EIC and the additional time necessary for the taxpayer or paid
preparer to fill out schedule EIC. TANF recipients, on the other hand, had costs such as
repeated visits to the welfare office, the assembling of documents such as school
attendance records and letters from employers. This cost is likely to be much greater than
the marginal costs to a taxpayer of applying for the EITC

Jeffrey B. Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and Income
Distribution”, Tax Policy and the Economy 12 (1998) : 111.
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The cost to the 1RS is quite small. The entire 1RS budget is roughly eight billion
dollars, and the 1RS serves roughly 120 million individual taxpayers and 15 million
corporations. The incremental cost of administering the EITC is a very small fraction of
this total. The U.S. General Accounting Office has estimated that the administrative
costs of the EITC are less than one percent of dollars transferred. Recent 1RS efforts to
combat EITC noncompliance have probably raised these costs. In 2001, the 1RS
proposed to use 1.59 percent of its budget toward EITC activities including compliances
services, filing and account services, pre-filing taxpayer assistance and education, and
administration of the EITC. Of the 1.59 percent, only 2.75 percent was to be used for
administration purposes.However, the entire 1RS budget in 2001 was $8.8 billion.
Even under the unlikely assumption that ten percent of 1RS costs were due to the EITC,
EITC administrative costs would be only three percent of benefits paid/^
Table 3.1 reveals the annual costs of various anti-child poverty programs in the
United States. While only Medicaid is larger in costs per year, the EITC has the
advantage of being the only program with relatively low administrative costs. The
estimate is between one and three percent of dollars transferred to recipients. The other
large cash-transfer program to children, TANF (prior to 1996 AFDC), reported much
higher administrative costs. By statute, states were required to keep their administrative
costs below 15 percent. In 1997, the total of state administrative costs for TANF was
$838 million while the total expenditures for all costs related to TANF was $9.9 billion,
which would make administrative costs only eight and a half percent of total

77

Internal Revenue Service, Accountability Report, 2001, available firom<http://irs.ustreas.gov> Internet;
accessed November 29 2002.
^^Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit”, 111.
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expenditures. However, if we take into account other costs such as computer systems
($100 million), other expenditures such as Electronic Benefit Transfer development,
fraud programs, quality control, emergency assessments, school readiness, teen
pregnancy prevention, payments for TANF families in shelters. Emergency Assistance,
and outreach advertising ($859 million), total costs to run the TANF program run closer
to 18 percent.^^ While a number of other expenditures are cash transfers to recipients, a
large part of the costs are fraud and quality programs, which should be counted toward
administrative costs of TANF as they are counted in the administrative costs of the EITC.
Under the new welfare law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, Congress streamlined the several funding
programs for child care into the Child Care and Development Block Grant. In fiscal year
1997, states spent $60 million to administer their child care programs This amount
consists of 2.4 percent of total federal and state fiinds. It is well below the maximum
limit of five percent. However, administrative costs do not include expenditures such as
computer systems, certificates to families, the improvement of quality child care services,
and determination of families that can receive child care support and other related
activities. States spent $9 million on child care computer systems, $83 million on costs
to provide certificates to families, and $121 million on determining which families can
receive child care support and other related activities, as well as $98 million on

The Administration for Children and Families, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program: First
Annual Report to Congress: Trends in Caseload and Expenditures, August 1998, available from
<http://www.acf.dhhs gov/news/welfare/congress/index.htm> Internet; accessed 29 November 2002.
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improving the quality of child care services. If we take into account these expenditures,
then the child care programs have administrative costs closer to 16 percent.
As for the Food Stamp program, in 1997, total expenditures were $21.5 billion, while
administrative costs ranged around $2 billion, which is ten percent of all expenditures. In
2001, the administrative costs were closer to thirteen percent of all expenditures.^^
The Child Tax Credit is a cash-transfer through the tax system, and like the EITC has
low administrative costs. Medicaid is in a different category all together as it is a health
insurance for low-income children, and, as do all health related programs, has high
administrative costs.
Table 3.1 Cost of various government programs
(dollars in m i l l i o n ) .

1998

1999

2000

2001

29,700

30,600

31,200

31,200

3,525

15,100

20,100

20,600

M edicaid

101,234

108,042

117,921

128,853*

TANF

13,286

14,161

15,464

17,080*

2,441

1,993

1,821

1,907*

2,028

2,254

2,237

2,423*

18,892

17,698

17,058

17,798

EITC
Child Tax Credit

Social Services Block Grant
Child Care
Food Stamps

Source: Data (Collected from Four sources: Internal Revenue Service, General Accounting Office,
Department of Agriculture and Department of Health and Human Services.
* Data reflects the enacted budget rather than the actual budget.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, State Spending under the Child Care Block Grant,
November 1998, available from <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/press/1998/cc97fimd.htm> Internet;
accessed November 28 2002.
Department of Agriculture, National Level Annual Summary: Participation and costs, 1969-2001,
October 2002, available from <http://www.fiis.usda.gov/pd/fssummar.htm> Internet; accessed November
30 2002.
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Looking at the administrative costs of the key anti-poverty programs, one can
assume that the EITC and the Child Tax Benefit have an advantage over the other
“welfare” programs, in terms of administrative costs. However, while they are successful
in investing the funds directly to the recipients, whether the “p o o f are being properly
targeted is another issue that will be examined in the next section.
Programs in Canada follow the same pattern as far as administrative costs are
concerned. The Canada Child Tax Benefit is a cash transfer through the tax system, and
therefore, has relatively low administrative costs. Recipients qualify for the CCTB
through their income tax returns, just as they do in the United States. Because the
payments are made on a monthly basis, there are higher costs than in the United States
due to postage, checks, and processing, however, it is still not as time consuming and
workforce demanding as “welfare” programs which require caseworkers.
Revenue Canada administers a number of benefit programs. The two largest are the
Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) and the goods and services tax/harmonized sales tax
(GST/HST) credit. There is also the Children’s Special Allowances (CSAs) paid to about
270 child care agencies and other institutions that are responsible for the care and
maintenance of children, and the Disability Tax Credit (DTC), which provides a nonrefundable tax credit for individuals who have a severe and prolonged impairment that
markedly restricts a basic activity of daily living. Revenue Canada also administers a
number of benefit programs on behalf of the provinces and territories, such as the Alberta
Family Employment Tax Credit, The BC Family Bonus, the New Brunswick Child Tax
Benefit, the Newfoundland Harmonized Sales Tax Credit, the Northwest Territories
Child Benefit, the Nova Scotia Child Benefit, and the Saskatchewan Child Benefit.
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Operating costs of all benefit programs administered through the federal tax system were
$38 million in the 1998-1999 benefit year. The Canada Child Tax Benefit was a large
percentage of this budget. However, even if the CCTB was the whole $38 million in
operating costs, with a total transfer cost of $5.7 billion, the percentage in
operating/administering costs is less than one p e r c e n t . A s this program is a benefit
offered to 80 percent of Canadian families with children, plainly the CCTB ranks high in
terms of cost-effectiveness.
Administrative costs for welfare programs are paid by the provinces through their
share of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), funded by the federal
government. For example, the province of Saskatchewan’s Social Services 1997-98
expenditure statement, which takes into account the expenditures of child care programs,
family and youth services programs and all income security programs, estimates the
administrative costs between four and thirteen percent, depending on the costs included
in the estimate.®^ Even using a narrow definition of administrative costs, welfare
programs such as subsidized child care, social assistance and youth programs have higher
administrative costs than tax-related benefit programs.

The recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Canada Child
Tax Benefit
Both the EITC and the CCTB claim to target low-income families. However, the
CCTB also has a basic tier which is received by 80 percent of families with children.
Canada has a two-tiered child benefit program, which attempts not only to fight child
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Benefit Programs Report 1998-99 Benefit Year, available from
<http://www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/benefits/rc4071_9899-e.html> Internet; accessed November 30 2002.
Saskatchewan Social Services, Annual Report 1998-1999, available from
<http://www.gov.sk.ca/socserv/publications/annualreports/pdfs/AnnualReport98-99.pdf> Internet; accessed
November 30 2002.
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poverty but also to remedy horizontal equity. To determine the targeting effectiveness of
both programs, it is necessary to examine the recipients of the programs in terms of
family size, family income, and sources of income.
In the United States, the EITC is only available to families with labor earnings,
which excludes all families receiving solely social assistance under the TANF program.
Consequently, these individuals who tend to fall much lower below the poverty line than
the working poor, are not being targeted by this program. Since the EITC’s main
objective is to encourage work by supplementing the incomes of the working poor, this is
not surprising. However, if this type of program was determined to be an effective means
of transferring funds to those in need, then the EITC’s income definition would have to
be modified or/and the EITC’s structure would have to be changed.
Table 3.2 restricts the sample of EITC recipients to families with children under age
18. It shows the percent distribution of total recipient families, the share of total credits,
and average credit amounts by selected family characteristics. Looking at the family type
category, female-headed families with children received an average credit of $1,828,
slightly higher than the average credit received by married-couple or male-headed
families ($1,654 and $1,582, respectively). Since female-headed families with children
are more likely to be poor, this trend is encouraging.
The number of children category in Table 3.2 reveals that families with two children
received $1,983, on average, substantially more than the average credit of $1,349
received by one-child families. However, as the number of children increases from two
to three children, and from three to four or more, the mean credit per child was $1,349 for
families with one child, $992 for those with two children, $677 for those with three
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children, and $467 for those with four or more children.*^ The per child values reveal
that the more children a family has, the less the credit received by the family is per child.
These statistics reveal inequity in credit amounts received by families of different sizes.
Some argue that the economy of scale justifies the payment range. Yet, these credits
most likely reflect government policies that seek to establish disincentives for the poor to
have more children.
Table 3.2 also points out that working parents still on TANF received relatively high
credit amounts, on average $1,873 a year. Yet their share of the total credit was very
small (ten percent).*^ This data implies that the EITC could be a significant source of
additional income once welfare recipients enter the workforce.
As far as poverty status and income class are concerned, 78.9 percent of EITC
dollars went to the poor or near-poor families with income-to-needs ratios of less than
1.5. However, Table 3.2 indicates that very few dollars went to the extreme poor, with
incomes below 50 percent of the poverty line (9.1 percent). The Table further indicates
that most recipients were concentrated in the phase-out range (62.1 percent), receiving
54.7 percent of the total credits.
As Table 3.2 reveals, the EITC suffers from certain weaknesses in terms of target
efficiency. More taxpayers with incomes above the poverty line benefit from EITC
payments, receiving more than half the total credit amount. Table 3,3 reveals that OBRA
1993 further increased the credit payments going to taxpayers above the poverty line, as a
consequence of having extended the break-even level of income. However, through the

Kim, “The Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit”, 14.
Ibid.
“ Ibid.
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Table 3.2

Percentage Distributions of Total Credits a n d Total
Recipient Families with Children b y Family
Characteristics: 1997.

All EITC families with
children under age 18
Family type
Two parents
Female-headed
Male-headed
No. of Children
•
One
•
Two
•
Three
•
Four of more
Age of household head
•
< Age 25
•
25-34
•
35-44
•
>or = 45
TANF Participation
•
On TANF
•
Not on TANF
Poverty Status^
•
Poor
•
Non poor
In com e-to-Needs Ratio®
•
<0.5
•
0.5-1
•
1-1.5
•
1.5-2
•
> or = 2
Race/Ethnicity
•
Non-His panic
W hite
•
Non-Hispanic
Black
•
Hispanic
•
O ther
EITC Stage
•
Phase-in
•
Stationary
•
Phase-out
Refundable Status
•
Refundable
•
Non refundable

•
•
•

Percent of total
caseload
100.0

Percent of total
credits
100.0

M ean credit per year
($)‘
1,735

41.8
49.9
8.4

39.8
52.5
7.7

1,654
1,828
1,582

41.5
35.1
16.3
7.1

32.2
40.2
19.1
8.5

1,349
1,983
2,032
2,081

14.9
37.7
34.1
13.3

14.5
38.8
35.2
11.5

1,685
1,785
1,794
1,498

9.3
90.7

10.0
90.0

1,873
1,721

37.1
62.9

46.8
53.2

2,191
1,466

11.0
26.1
28.7
22.3
11.9

9.1
37.8
32.0
15.0
6.2

1,430
2,512
1,933
1,166
901

52.1

48.8

1,627

22.5

23.7

1,825

21.7
3.7

23.6
3.9

1,886
1,819

24.1
13.7
62.1

23.8
21.4
54.7

1,714
2,698
1,537

82.4
17.6

94.4
5.6

2,009
524

Source’. Rebecca Y. Kim, “The EfTects of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Children’s Income
and Poverty: Who Fares Better?”, Journal of Poverty 5 no. 1 (2001) : 13.
Notes:
^The Credit is the amount before subtracting a family’s federal income tax liability.
^Poverty status is determined by comparing a family’s pre-tax cash income against the poverty
threshold.
^The income-to-needs ratio is a family’s pre-tax cash income divided by the poverty line.
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Table 3.3

Antipoverty Effectiveness of the EITC under the Law prior
to OBRA93 and under OBRA93 when fully phas e d in b y 1996.

Prior
Law

OBRA
93

7.582
6.211
EITC eligible taxpayers with incomes above the poverty line
(millions)
$8,994
$6,224
• EITC payments to these households (millions S)
4.084
5.451
EITC eligible taxpayers with incomes below the poverty line
(millions)
$5,820
$9,020
• EITC payments to these households (millions S)
$20,156
$23,982
—Pre EITC poverty gap (millions $)
$17,574
$14,544
-Post EITC poverty gap (millions $)
0.909
1.380
Number of households taken out of poverty by the EITC (millions)
Source: John Karl Scholz, “Tax Policy and the Working Poor: The Earned Income Tax Credit”, Focus 15
No- 3 (Winter 1993-1994) : 5.
Note: The poverty gap is defined as the difference between cash income (the sum of earnings, dividends,
interest, social security, public assistance, SSI, veterans payments, pensions, unemployment, and
alimony) and the poverty line.

extension of the EITC to childless workers between the ages of 25 and 64, the number of
taxpayers eligible for the EITC below the poverty line has increased by approximately 33
percent .

The relatively minor effect of the EITC on the poverty gap is a direct result of

the program’s focus on the working poor. The current EITC parameters were chosen to
ensure that families with a full-time minimum wage worker would not be poor.
However, many poor children are in households that do not contain a full-time worker.
The EITC has been successful at helping the working poor near the poverty line, and
the working poor female headed households. However, the 1993 OBRA extended the
credit to more families with children above the poverty line, rather than under the poverty
line. Unlike the CCTB, the EITC has a limited effect on the poverty gap, because it
excludes the poor who do not have earned income, which is a greater percentage of the
poor.

John Karl Scholz, “Tax Policy and the Working Poor: The Earned Income Tax Credif’, Focus 15 No. 3
(Winter 1993-1994) ; 5.
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While the EITC’s targeting effectiveness could be improved, overall, its intended
recipients are being reached. Scholz estimated in 1994, through data from tax returns and
the SIPP, that 80-86 percent of taxpayers eligible for the EITC appeared to receive it in
1990.
The CCTB’s two-tier structure has enabled it to battle poverty more successfully. In
addition, by making the basic credit available to 80 percent of Canadian families, it also
ensures its popularity, as a large percentage of the population benefits from the credit.
Table 3.4 illustrates the number of CCTB beneficiaries by family net income and type.
Looking at the number of families receiving CCTB with one parent earning $15,000 or
less, they consist of 71 percent of the overall number of families receiving CCTB,
earning less than $15,000. Knowing that single-parent families are much more likely to
be poor than two-parent families, it would appear that the CCTB is targeting this at-risk
group. Digging fiirther into these numbers, the overall number of one-parent families is
only 32.5 percent of all families receiving CCTB benefits, while the two parent families
are 67.5 percent of all beneficiaries. The largest group of beneficiaries is the two-parent
group earning more than $30,000. They comprise 48 percent of all benefit recipients.
They also receive the largest total amount of credit at 32 percent. However, considering,
that one-parent families earning under $15,000 comprise only 17 percent of CCTB
recipients, they receive 25 percent of the total amount of the credit. The average credit
per one parent family earning less than $15,000 is much higher. Without knowing the
number of children per family, it is difficult to assess the average credit received by each
child in each category, however, since the amounts for the first, second, and third child
are almost identical, a rough estimate demonstrates that the lower income groups (under
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$15,000 and $15,001 - $26,000) receive higher credits than the other two income groups.
Yet, the average credit for the $15,000 or less group is not significantly higher than the
average credit for the $15,001 - $26,000 group
The NCBS data reflects what one would expect for the most part. By adding
together the one and two parent groups earning less than $15,000, the percentage of the
NCBS credit received by these families is 59 percent of the total NCBS credit. Since the
NCBS is meant to aid low-income earners under $22,000, it would appear that it is
achieving its goal. The $15,001 - $26,000 category is 37 percent of the total credit,
indicating that 96 percent of those who receive the NCBS credit earn less than $26,000.
This data seems to confirm that the NCBS is reaching its target
The 1999 federal budget applied the previous years’ data to demonstrate the family
type pattern that should be observed with the 2000 budget increases. It projected that
over three-quarters of all CCTB benefits would go to one-eamer families and single
parent families. The data displayed in Table 3.4 confirms the pattern projected by the
1999 federal budget in figure 3.1.
As the CCTB is not only attempting to combat child poverty, but also trying to create
horizontal equity for all Canadian families, the data observed in Table 3.4 is not
shocking. The basic tier of the CCTB is distributed to 80 percent of all Canadian
families, as the break-even income level is close to $70,000, and therefore likely to be
received by many in the above $30,000 category
Comparing the target efficiency of the EITC and the CCTB, it would appear that the
NCBS allows the CCTB to be more successful at targeting its intended recipients, as it
exists solely to aid low-income families. Furthermore, since welfare recipients may
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Table 3.4

Canada Child Tax Benefit Beneficiaries b y Family N et Income,
Family Type and CCTB/NCB Supplement (NCBS) , July 2 0 0 0 -June
2001.

One Parent Families
Family Net
Income
•
•
•
•

S15,000 o r less
$15,001 - $26,000
$26,000-$30,000
M ore than
$30,000

Total

Children
with
CCTB

Families
with
CCTB

$ CCTB
paid

Children
with NCBS

Families
with NCBS

$NCBS paid

905,984
398,034
94.159

543,940
245,317
61,967

1,786,462,741
740,565,334
121,836,998

905,147
397,678
94,026

543,497
245,127
61,897

745,548,719
300,591,980
18,985,659

289,021

192,879

237,097,966

2,321

630

209,472

1,687.198

1,044,103

2,885,963,038

1,399,172

851,158

1,065,335,829

Two Parent Families
Family Net
Income
•
•
•
•

$15,000 or less
$15,001 - $26,000
$26,000-$30,000
M ore than
$30,000

Total

Children
with
CCTB

Families
with
CCTB

$ CCTB
paid

Children
with NCBS

Families
with NCBS

$NCBS paid

444,478
553,647
223.572

220,505
279,847
115.610

878.656,946
1 .0 4 7 J 5 7 J 9 0
306,167,690

444,478
553,647
223,251

220,505
279,847
115,492

358,102,504
401,704,850
46,493.557

2,959,897

1,553,448

1,908,973,274

27,456

5,894

3,515,923

4,181,594

2,169,410

4,141,155,301

1,248,832

621,738

809,816,835

Children
with
CCTB

Families
with
CCTB

$ CCTB
paid

Clnldren
with NCBS

Families
with NCBS

$NCBS paid

1,350,462
951,681
317,731

764,445
525,164
177,577

2,665,119,687
1,787,922,724
428,004,689

1,349,625
951,325
317,277

764,002
524,974
177,389

1,103,651,223
702,296,831
65,479,217

3,248,918

1,746,327

2,146,071,240

29,777

6,524

3,725,394

5,868,792

3,213,513

7,027,118J 3 9

2,648,004

1,472,889

1,875,152,665

All Families
Family Net
Income
•
•
•
•

Total

$15,000 or less
$15,001 - $26,000
$26,000-$30,000
M ore than
$30,000

Source: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency
Notes: The CCTB includes the NCBS.

Figure 3.1 CCTB Recipients: Percentage
of total benefits by family type, 2000.
□ One-eamer
families
□ Two-earner

Source: Budget 1999
Note: The percentages are previsions for the year 2000.
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receive the CCTB without penalty to their welfare income; it elevates more people out of
poverty. In contrast, the NCBS is deducted from welfare benefits. This is not reflected
in the data in Table 3.4, as the payments are made to welfare beneficiaries on a monthly
basis, and then deducted from the amount of welfare they receive from their respective
provinces, therefore, the impressive targeting seen by the under $15,000 group in Table
3.4 may not be quite as impressive in reality.

The effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Canada Child
Tax Benefit on welfare caseload and employment rates
The effects of the EITC and the CCTB on welfare caseload and employment rates
are difficult to assess as these two indicators are influenced by many factors other than
the two benefit programs. Several studies have been conducted on both programs to
determine whether they have had an effect on welfare caseload and whether they have led
to increases in employment rates.
With the reform of the welfare legislation in 1996, programs such as the EITC are
more important than ever. As most states have five-year limits on welfare benefits and
sanctions on benefits for recipients who do not regain in part or in full the labor force
after 24 months, other programs must be in place to help in the welfare to work transition.
As families move from welfare to full-time minimum wage work, a considerable portion
of the increase in income is due to the EITC Without federal and state EITC programs, a
Mississippi family of three moving from no work to part-time work at minimum wage,
would receive a 67 percent increase in income; however, when the EITC is included, the
increase is 108 percent. If the same family of three lived in the state of New York, it
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would benefit from an increase of 19 percent if it moved from no work to part-time
minimum wage work; however, when the EITC is included the increase is 45 percent.
The EITC acts as a work incentive program by providing supplements to low-income
earners. Recent studies have concluded that the EITC increases employment, earnings,
and income, especially among single-parent families. These studies (Meyer and
Rosenbaum, 1998; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Smeeding, Ross and O’Connor, 1999)
attribute much of the recent and dramatic rise in single-parent labor force participation
rates to the EITC. As the generosity of the EITC has increased over the years, so has
women’s participation in the labor force.
Eissa and Liebman examined the 1986 EITC expansion to estimate its effects on the
employment of single women and their hours of work. To isolate those affected by the
policy from those who were not, they treated single women with children as their
experimental group and single women without children as their control group. They
found that the 1986 EITC changes increased employment among all single women with
children by as much as 2.8 percentage points (from a base of 74.2 percent). They also
found that single women with children with less than a high school education’s
employment increased by six percent.
In 1999, Meyer and Rosenbaum further reinforced these findings in their analysis of
the effects of the EITC and other policy changes on the employment of single women.
Their study takes into account, more than any other study in the literature of the EITC,

Gregory Acs, Nonna Coe, Keith Watson and Robert I. Lerman, “Does Work Pay? An Analysis of the
Work Incentives Under TANF’, The Urban Institute, Occasional Paper Number 9 (July 1998) : 2.
V. Joseph Hotz, Charles H. Mullin and John Karl Scholz, “The Earned Income Tax Credit and Labor
Market Participation of Families on Welfare”, Joint Centerfor Poverty Research, Working Paper 214
(January 2001) : 12.
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changes that occurred over the last two decades. Furthermore, their study nets out the
influence of changes in other policies, both over time and across place of residence in
order to isolate the influence of the EITC. Meyer and Rosenbaum studied the
employment statistics of single women from 1984-1996. They found that EITC changes
accounted for 63 percent of the increase in the employment rate of single mothers from
1984 to 1996 and 37 percent of the increase from 1992 to 1996.^® The annual labor force
participation rate among single women with children rose from 72.7 percent in 1984 to
82.1 percent in 1996.^^ The increase in participation has been particularly significant
among less-educated women. Between 1984 and 1996, the annual participation rate of
single women with children and less than a high-school education rose from 46.8 to 58.8
percent.^^ The increase in labor force participation among women with children reflects a
decline in the number of people who receive welfare without working.
Table 3.5 demonstrates how the percentage of women who receive welfare and do
not work during the year has decreased from 20.8 percent in 1984 to 10.8 percent in
1996- In return, this has resulted in a 9.5 percentage point increase in the share of single
women with children that work at least part of the year, while only a 0.5 percentage point
increase in the number of single women who do not work and do not receive public
assistance.
While some may point to the market and economic growth to explain the increase in
the labor-market activity of single women with children, a comparison of single women
with children and without children demonstrates that the labor force participation of

^Ibid.
Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credif’, 97.
^ Ibid., 97.
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Table 3.5 Labor Market and Welfare Participation of Single W o men
with Childrenr 1984-1996.

Percentage of Single Women aged 16-45 with children who:

Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

Work and
receive no
welfare
during the
year

Work and
receive
welfare
during the
year

Receive
welfare and do
not work
during the
year

Neither work
nor receive
welfare during
the year

62.9
61.9
61.0
61.6
62.7
65.3
62.8
61.4
60.9
61.2
64.5
67.2
68.6

9.7
11.5
11.8
12.2.
11.6
10.5
13.1
12.6
12.8
14.2
14.6
13.3
13.5

20.8
20.1
20.4
18.9
19.4
17.7
17.9
19.4
19.3
18.0
14.3
12.4
10.8

6.6
6.6
6.9
7.3
6.4
6.4
6.3
6.6
6.9
6.6
6.6
7.1
7.1

Source'. JefiErey B. Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and Income
Distribution”, Tax Policy and the Economy 12 (1998) ; 98.

single women without children has actually decreased. Figure 3.2 reveals the labor
participation trend of both women with and without children from 1984 to 1996. It
demonstrates how the participation rate of women without children has fallen, while
participation among women with children has risen dramatically. Indeed, among loweducated single women without children the participation rate has fallen from 78.3 to
72.3 percent since 1984.^^
Further critics may argue that the EITC is not necessarily the culprit behind the rise
in labor force participation by single mothers. However, the Eissa and Liebman study
tested the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) expansion of the EITC by

93

Ibid., 98.
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Figure 3.2 Annual Labor Force Parttoipâtton FUtt^ ^
Women with and without Children.
100
95
90

Single women without
children

85
80

Single women with
children

75
70
65
1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

Source: JefiBrey B. Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and Income
Distribution”, Tax Policy and the Economy 12 (1998) : 99.

comparing the labor-force behavior of single women with children (who were eligible for
the credit) with the labor-force behavior of single women without children (who were
ineligible), before and after the expansion. The other aspects of TRA86, such as the
increase in the value of dependent exemptions and of the standard deduction, simply
reinforced the EITC expansion by increasing the return to work for single women with
children more than it did for single women without children. The total size of the
“natural experiment” was equivalent to a $1,331 (1996 dollars) increase in the maximum
EITC. The study carefiilly controlled for other factors that might have caused the trends.
It concludes that TRA86 increased labor-force participation among single women with
children by 2.8 percentage points, from 73.0 to 75.8 percent. This implies that an extra
164,000 women entered the labor force.^"^

94

Ibid., 99.
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Based on Liebman and Eissa’s analysis, if it is assumed that there is a constant
relationship between the dollar value of the maximum EITC and the percentage of single
women with children who work at some point during the year, then in 1998 there would
have been 405,000 taxpayers who were working because of the EITC, and would have
been non-working welfare recipients in its absence. Furthermore, the study implied that
the EITC was responsible for 59 percent of the increase in labor force participation that
occurred between 1984 and 1996.^^
Meyer and Rosenbaum’s 1997 study modeled state welfare policies and labor-market
conditions, as well as the level of the EITC, in order to determine the relative importance
of each factor. They found that state welfare policies and labor-market conditions
accounted for only a slight share of the relative increase in labor force participation
among single women with children, and that the timing of the increases in EITC
corresponded closely with increases in labor force participation.^^ However, it is unlikely
that EITC recipients respond so quickly to the expansions in the credit. It would take a
couple of years for them to realize the effect of the credit on their income.
Labor supply theory suggest that the EITC will cause some secondary earners in
married couples to leave the labor force. However, so far there is little evidence to
support these claims. Even if the EITC were causing a large decrease in participation by
secondary earners, the decrease might not be a reason for concern. If families respond to
the additional income from the EITC by deciding that the secondary earner should
consume more leisure, then there is no deadweight loss from the reduction in
participation. There would only be deadweight loss if the reduction in the net wage due
Ibid., 100.
^ Ibid., 101.
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Figure 3.3 The B TO *W m # #

Maximum EITC

= mHabor
i Force
Participation Differences
MP^ '

Source: Jeffrey B. Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and Income
Distribution”, Tax Policy and the Economy 12 (1998) : 101.

to the phase out of the credit caused the secondary earner to leave the labor force.^^
While the EITC encourages work for the most part, like other programs, it has a phase
out range. In the phase-in range, taxpayers are encouraged to work more in order to
receive a larger credit. In the flat range, taxpayers do not earn a larger credit if they work
more hours, still, the amount of the credit is not reduced if they work more hours
(provided they stay in the flat range). However, once taxpayers earn enough to be in the
phase-out range, the incentive to work more hours is no longer present. As sixty percent
of EITC recipients are in the phase-out range since the OBRA93 expansion, many have
expressed concerns over the work disincentives of the credit. Twenty three percent of
EITC eligible taxpayers are in the phase-in range, while sixteen percent are in the flat
range, therefore thirty nine percent of taxpayers have incentives to work more or at least
not decrease their work hours.^*
^ Ibid., 102.
^ Scholz, “Tax Policy and the Working Poor”, 8.
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While this schedule may not be ideal, it is nevertheless more likely to encourage
work than other cash-transfer programs. Furthermore, this is under the assumption that
taxpayers understand the EITC system; that they consciously calculate the credit amount
that supplements their income level to ensure that they do not earn above a certain
amount. This would require the taxpayer to receive the credit at least twice to compare
with more work and less work and then adjust his behavior in the third year, assuming
that the household wages and incomes remained fixed during the three years and all other
factors stayed the same. In 1988, only thirty eight percent of EITC recipients had filed
tax returns claiming the EITC in the previous two years. Thirty three percent of the
recipients were receiving the credit for the first time.^^ Therefore, the majority of
recipients was receiving the credit for the first time and would not have had the
opportunity to learn about its marginal incentives from previous experience with the
credit. The lack of opportunity to leam about the EITC incentives is in sharp contrast to
the fi'equent opportunities to leam of incentives in the welfare system and in the parts of
the income-tax system that affect regular paychecks.
In terms of the EITC effect on welfare caseload, it is quite difficult to analyze due to
several reasons. First, AFDC/TANF beneficiaries usually start to work for a number of
reasons and not simply for one benefit. Second, the new welfare legislation (1996) has
significantly changed the way the welfare system operates. Current welfare beneficiaries
have a five-year lifetime benefit limit and in most states they need to regain the
workforce in some capacity within two years. Therefore, the restructuring of the welfare
program has drastically reduced the number of welfare recipients and the amount being
^ Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit”, 107.
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spent on welfare by the governments. Between 1990 and 1994, the number of families
receiving assistance from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) exploded by
27 percent, while between 1994 and 1999 the number plunged by nearly 50 percent.
Researchers have attributed the decline in welfare caseload to two sources: 1-the longest
economic expansion in U.S. history; 2-the radical changes in social policy. Among the
policy changes, two particularly stand out: expansions in the EITC, and welfare reform,
implemented through state level waivers from federal rules in the early 1990s and
through federal legislation in 1996. The problem, however, is determining the extent to
which the economy and policy reforms have affected the rapid changes in welfare
caseload.
Looking at the welfare caseload trends in the 1980s in comparison to the 1990s, one
can look at the effect of the economy on caseload to determine why it had a greater effect
in the 1990s than in the 1980s. The growth in labor productivity in the 1990s allowed
employers to reach deep into the lower tail of the income distribution for workers and to
reward them with higher real wages. In contrast, during the 1980s falling real wage rates
for low-wage workers had resulted in falling real incomes and inevitably upward pressure
on welfare caseload. Furthermore, the expansion in the 1990s was experienced in all
regions across the United States. In contrast, in the late 1980s the auto and steel
industries recovered, but the oil industry experienced a bust, which led to recessions in
Texas and some Rocky Mountain States, and increases in AFDC and Food Stamp
caseloads. The mid-to-late 1990s did not experience such regional shocks. This

James P. Ziliak, "‘Social Policy and the Macroeconomy: What drives welfare caseloads?”. Focus 22 no.
1 (Special Issue 2002) : 29.
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undoubtedly led to decreases in welfare caseloads based more largely on the economy
than on the welfare reforms.
However, once the effects of the welfare reform and the economy on welfare
caseloads are taken into account, a sizeable amount of decline remains unexplained.
There is no specific numbers on the effect of the EITC on welfare caseload decline
because the studies use state-level panel data, and the EITC expansions affected all states
at the same time. This implies that it is not possible to distinguish the effects of the EITC
from the effects of the aggregate factors that might affect simultaneously state-level
caseload movements such as national unemployment rates, oil price shocks, and even
presidential elections. Indeed, there might even be a larger dimension to welfare reform
that is entwined with the EITC and other national forces (national political pressure).
Table 3 .2 (on page 56) looks at the characteristics of families with children who
received EITC in 1997. It found that 9.3 percent of EITC recipients were on TANF.
Furthermore, this 9.3 percent received 10 percent of the overall credit. Recipients receive
a relatively high credit amount, on average $1,873 per year or $153 month. This monthly
payment is quite large, especially in states such as Mississippi where TANF payments are
quite low. However, the EITC payments depend on the income disregards of the states.
If the disregards are too steep, than the TANF recipients will not benefit from the EITC.
However, TANF recipients gained the least from the EITC in terms of its anti-poverty
effects because most TANF recipients are well below the poverty line and need very
large increases in annual income to be lifted out of poverty.
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Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services» Administration for Children and Families, Office
of Planning, Research and Evaluation.

The CCTB is somewhat different than the EITC as its basic tier is offered to 80
percent of families, regardless of their source of income. Welfare beneficiaries can
receive the first-tier, the basic Child Tax Benefit. However, the second-tier, the NCBS,
functions in a similar manner as the EITC, as it targets only low-income families by
acting as a wage supplement. Therefore, the NCBS credit counts as income for welfare
recipients and is subtracted from their benefits. Few studies have been conducted on the
CCTB’s effect on employment due to its recent enactment, and because only one-tier of
the benefit is meant to specifically act as a work incentive. One study that has been
carried out, tracked where low-income families received their income from 1984 to 1999.
Figure 3.5 demonstrates that government transfers continue to play an important role as a
source of family income for low-income families. In keeping with the economic
recovery in the 1990s, an increasing proportion of the income of low-income families
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came from employment earnings. In 1992, low-income families earned on average
$3,780. This amount represented approximately 23 percent of the total income of lowincome families. In 1999, low-income families earned on average $4,825, which
represented 26 percent of their total income.
Figure 3,5 Sources o f Family Income, Low-income Families
nnth Children, Pre-Tax LICOs (expressed in 1999 dollars).
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Furthermore, the proportion of low-income families, in which the parents had paid
employment, increased in the late 1990s. As Figure 3.6 illustrates, the proportion of lowincome families with children, in which at least one parent was employed for pay during
the year, increased from 59.4 percent in 1994 to 67.2 percent in 1999. The proportion of
one-parent families employed for pay rose from 42.5 percent to 53.4 percent over the
same period.
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Figure 3 6 Pre-tax LICOsPercentage o f Low -incom e Fam ilies
Em ployed for Pay During the Year,
by Fam ily Type, 1984-1999.
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Families on social assistance also declined in the 1990s. The number of one-parent
families relying on social assistance declined from 472,500 households in March 1995 to
306,300 in March 2000. While the number of two-parent families with children
decreased from 178,600 to 105,700 households over the same period. As a result, the
number of children living in families relying on social assistance decreased by 440,400
between 1995 and 2000. harrowing the period from March 1998 to March 2000, the
number of two-parent families in receipt of social assistance decreased by 28.2 percent
while the number of one-parent families receiving social assistance decreased by 23.8
percent. By comparing the reduction in caseloads of families with children to that of
families without children over the same period, we can see that two-parent family welfare
caseload numbers decreased by 28.2 percent while those of couples without children
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decreased by only 7.0 percent.

This reduction in welfare caseload is due to economic

growth, welfare reform and other factors such as the CCTB.
Figure i. 7 Social Assistance Data in March o f each period^ 1987-1999,
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While these indicators are encouraging, they do not reflect a direct link to the CCTB
Since the two-tier program has only been in existence for four years, no studies or data
are available to link the CCTB to employment or welfare caseload changes. However, all
economic indicators such as decreases in unemployment, welfare caseload, and poverty
rate for children and their parents seem to indicate that the CCTB is having a positive
effect, however, the extent of the effect is yet to be known.

The effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Canada Child Tax
Benefit on poverty level and poverty gap
The EITC and the CCTB both have a common goal of reducing poverty among
families and, specifically, among children. Both programs serve as work incentives by
attempting to reduce dependence upon the welfare system, and increasing the
“permanent” attachment to the workforce by reducing marginal costs of reintegrating the
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workforce. The belief is that if the programs are successful at doing this, then poverty
caused by unemployment will be reduced.
Several studies have been performed on the EITC to determine its effect on poverty
rates and poverty gap. In 1997, Rebecca Kim studied the effects of the EITC on poverty
rate and poverty gap by measuring the effect of the EITC on the percentage increase in
disposable income and the percentage reductions in poverty rate and poverty gap. She
found that the EITC increased the disposable income of families with children under age
18 by only 1.2 percent. However, recipient families with children saw an increase of 9.9
percent in their disposable income. She also found that the poverty rate for all families
with children under IS in 1997 was 19.2 percent; 11.8 percent for those ineligible for the
EITC and 37.1 percent for those eligible for the EITC The EITC contributed to a modest
decline in child poverty by decreasing the overall poverty rate from 19.2 percent to 16.2
percent (a 15.6 percent decrease) and the total poverty gap from $53.1 billion to $45.4
billion (a 14.6 percent decrease). The limited effect on the overall child poverty rate is
due to the fact that EITC benefits are limited to working low-income families and that 63
percent of the recipient families were non-poor.
Table 3.6 indicates that the EITC reduced poverty to a larger degree for the recipient
families (with children under age 18) by reducing their poverty rate by 27.2 percent and
the poverty gap by 33.0 percent. Furthermore, the Table shows that as the number of
children increased in a family, so did the poverty rate. In particular, families with four or
more children showed a high poverty rate (67.2 percent), yet the EITC helps this poorest
group the least by only reducing their poverty rate and poverty gap by 14.0 percent and
27.7 percent respectively. While the U.S. poverty thresholds take into account the
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number of children in a family, the EITC does not adjust for families with more than two
children.
Families on TANF were also among the poorest groups with a poverty rate of 71.6
percent. However, the EITC only reduces the rate by 16.3 percent and the poverty gap by
26.0 percent. The Table fiirther indicates that families with incomes between 50 and 100
percent of the poverty line escaped poverty by receiving the EITC, however, no families
with incomes below 50 percent of the poverty line were able to escape poverty through
the EITC, and moreover, their poverty gap was only reduced by 14.2 percent. This
would point to the fact that the EITC does not aid families without earned income, and
that perhaps, the credit is not generous enough to reach those well below the poverty line.
Scholz estimated in 1994 that only 36 percent of EITC payments go toward reducing the
poverty gap, while the remaining 64 percent is received by taxpayers above the poverty
line. Scholz further estimated that 17 percent of EITC-eligible taxpayers do not claim the
credit, 35 percent of poor households have no earning, and the EITC raises some
recipient households only part of the way to the poverty line, resulting in poverty gap
offset of only 12 percent for households with children.

Only about 40 percent of

households with incomes below 50 percent of the poverty line receive the EITC, while 80
percent of households with incomes between 100 percent and 150 percent of the poverty
line receive the EITC/°^
In 2001, with the economic recovery slowing down, the depth of poverty increased.
The average amount by which individuals who were poor fell below the poverty line rose
to $2,707 per poor person in 2001. This is the largest per person poverty gap since the
Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit”, 90.
Ibid., 91.
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data has been recorded (1979). The average amount by which poor children fell below
the poverty line also increased, reaching its highest point since 1979. Data indicates that
children were poorer on average in 2001 than any other year since 1979 because the
safety net programs did less last year than any other year since 1979. Furthermore, the
limited amount of the EITC is clearly not enough to combat the effects of the welfare
reforms and economic slowdown.
Table 3.6

The Effects of the EITC on Poverty Rate and Poverty Gap for
Families with Children Under Age 18: 1997.
Poverty Gap
N o EITC ($)

W/EITC ($)

53.1

45.4

Percent
Decrease
14.6

19.2

16.2

Percent
Decrease
15.6

11.8

11.8

0.0

29.7

29.7

0.0

31.5
42.9
30.0

22.6
31.9
19.7

28.3
25.6
34.3

8.7
13.3
1.4

5.5
9.2
1.0

37.6
30.2
30.1

31.7
33.1
46.3
67.2

23.1
21.7
36.7
57.8

27.1
34.4
20.7
14.0

6.6
6.7
5.6
4.5

4.6
4.2
3.7
3.3

30.9
37.9
33.8
27.7

53.8
38.1
33.5
24.8

40.9
28.5
23.8
18.5

24.0
25.2
29.0
25.4

5.2
9.2
7.1
1.9

3.7
6.1
4.6
1.4

27.7
34.3
35.8
30.5

71.6
33.6

59.9
23.8

16.3
29.2

4.6
18.9

3.4
12.3

26.0
34.7

100.0
100.0

100
59.6

0.0
40.4

12.7
10.8

10.9
4.8

14.2
55.2

84.4
67.2
11.8

78.9
37.1
4.9

6.5
44.8
58.5

17.0
3.7
2.7

13.3
1.4
1.0

21.8
63.0
64.2

45.4
0.2

32.7
0.2

28.0
0.0

28.0
0.0

23.4
0.02

33.0
6.8

N o EITC (%)
All fam ilies w /children
(n = 19,549)
Ineligible fam ilies
w /children (n=3,653)
EITC fam ilies w /children
(n=5,896)
Family Type
•
Two-parent
•
Fem ale-headed
#
M ale-headed
No. o f qualifying children
•
One
•
Two
•
Three
•
Four or m ore
Age o f household head
•
< age 25
•
25-34
•
35-44
•
>45
TANF participation
•
O n TAN F
•
Not on TANF
Incom e to need s ratio
•
< 0.5
•
0.5-1
EITC Stage
*
Phase-in
•
Stationary
•
Phase out
R efundable Status
•
R efundable
•
Nonrefundable

Poverty Rate
W/EITC

Source: Rebecca Y. Kim, “The Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Children’s Income and
Poverty: Who Fares Better?”, Journal of Poverty 5 no. 1 (2001) : 17.

Estimates report that 2.5 million children are lifted out of poverty every year due to
the EITC. However, since in 2001 there were 17.8 million children below the poverty
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line. This means that the EITC has only reached out to 14 percent of children living in
poverty. Clearly, much more is needed for the EITC to seriously combat poverty. Seeing
as the program has low administrative costs and its intended recipients are being targeted,
there is no reason why the EITC cannot be further increased in order for the program to
become a major anti-child poverty tool in the United States.
The CCTB had similar effects upon child poverty rates. In 1999, the CCTB was
reported to have increased the income of 1.2 million families with 2.1 million children.
Furthermore, the low-income gap was reduced by 6.5 percent, and the number of children
living in low-income families was reduced from its high of 1,499,000 in 1996 to
1,298,000 in 1999. Figure 14 shows that the number of low-income families with
children is still on the decline. After declining from a peak of 20.4 percent in 1996 to
17.9 percent in 1998, the incidence of low-income families with children dropped to 17.2
percent in 1999. But 17.2 percent is still much higher than the 1989 low of 14.6
percent.

The reduction translates into 16,500 families with 33,800 children moving

above the LICOs between 1998 and 1999 as 668,800 families with children lived in low
income. If the CCTB had not been introduced, 17.6 percent rather than 17.2 percent of
families with children would have lived in low income. In other words, 685,300 families
would have lived in low income if not for the CCTB Of the 16,500 families that left low
income, about 10,800 were two-parent families with 23,000 children and 5,200 were
single-parent families with 10,200.
The introduction of the CCTB led to a low-income gap reduction of $400 million.
The decline in low-income gap for two-parent families was $235 million, a decline of 7.5
Federal, National Child Benefit Progress Report.
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percent in the low-income gap during that year. For one-parent families the decline was
$160 million or 5.5 percent.
Figure 3.8 Percentage o f Low-incom e Families with Children.
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Table 3.7 Change in Families with Children Living in Low Income :
January to December 1999.

SLID 1999

ONETWOALL
PARENT PARENT
FAMILIES
FAMILIES FAMILIES
PRE-TAX LICOS
Decline in Number of Children Living in Low Income
10,200
23,000
33,800
5,200
Decline in Number of Families Living in Low Income
10,800
16,500
Percentage Change in Number o f Families Living in
- 1.6%
-3.2%
- 2.4%
Low Income
Decline in Incidence of Low Income Among Families
0.7
0.3
0.4
with Children*
Source'. Based on Statistics Canada special tabulations from the SLID 1999.
^Decline in incidence of low income is expressed in percentage points.
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Table 3.8

Changes in the Depth of Low Income : January to December

1999.

SLID 1999
PRE-TAX LICOS
Decline in the Lowincome Gap (in millions
of dollars)
Percentage Change in the
Low-income Gap

ONE-PARENT
FAMILIES

TWO PARENT
FAMILIES

ALL
FAMILIES

$160

$235

$400

- 5.5%

- 7.5%

- 6.5%

Source: Based on Statistics Canacla special tabulations firom the SLID 1999.

The Compliance Issue
No other topic has been as controversial as compliance in the EITC literature.
Transfer payments through the tax system have lower administrative costs, but the trade
off is the higher noncompliance rate. While the EITC has managed to survive almost
three decades, because it encourages work and because it supports only the "deserving"
poor, however, it has been the subject of much criticism due to its high levels of
noncompliance. The Internal Revenue Service has expended much energy in its attempts
to reduce the noncompliance rate. The endeavors have had some success in the latter
parts of the 1990s. However, attempts to reduce noncompliance have generated added
expenses.
Concerns over noncompliance were first heard in the late 1980s to early 1990s when
studies tabulated from the IRS’s Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP),
first presented by Holtzblatt (1991) and Scholz (1990), indicated that one-third of 1985
and 1988 recipients should have been deemed ineligible for the credit. Over half the
claims were disqualified because the recipients either did not have children or should not
have claimed the child, while 30 percent were disqualified because they misreported
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earnings or AGI. In 1998, 10.4 million claimed the EITC, however, only 7.1 million
were entitled to the credit. Therefore, of the $5.6 billion in credit payment, ineligible
recipients claimed nearly $2 billion.

These figures were alarming due to the fact that

programs such as the AFDC had noncompliance rates of 4 percent.'
However, since 1988, the 1RS has made changes to the eligibility rules in an attempt
to reduce noncompliance. The first modifications in response to noncompliance took
place in 1990. Congress eliminated the support test that had previously been in place.
The support test had been established to prove that the taxpayer provided over half the
support for the child who made him eligible for the EITC. Certain items that were
counted as support for the child, but not provided by the taxpayer, included AFDC, child
support, and public housing benefits. If the value of these items exceeded the taxpayer’s
income (including the implicit rental value of owner-occupied housing), the taxpayer
failed to meet the support test and was deemed ineligible for the EITC. While these
guidelines were detailed in the rules accompanying the 1040 form, it seems unlikely that
many taxpayers would be aware of them as they prepared their taxes. The support test
was replaced with the restriction that the qualifying child had to live with the taxpayer
more than half the year. By simplifying the rules of eligibility, the 1RS hoped to
significantly decrease noncompliance.
The 1990 legislation also added a new two-page form titled Schedule EIC.
Taxpayers have to complete the first page to receive the credit. The first page details the
rules of eligibility, and gathers information about the two youngest children (including

Holtz, “Tax Policy and the Working Pooi^, 6.
Liebman, “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax C r e d if112.
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their social security numbers), and on nontaxable income. The second page explains how
to calculate the EITC.
Further studies were conducted on tax year 1994 to see if the 1990 changes had
reduced the noncompliance rates. The 1RS estimated that 25.8 percent of EITC or $4.4
billion (budget had tripled) was overclaimed. On the other hand, the study also
demonstrated that some EITC eligible recipients failed to receive the full amount to
which they were entitled. The amount totaled $293 million, or 1.7 percent of the total
EITC claimed. Scholz also demonstrated in 1990 that 13.6 to 19.5 percent of eligible
recipients had not claimed the benefit in tax year 1990.
In 1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) required taxpayers to
provide SSNs for all children, even those under the age of one. PRWORA 1996
permitted the 1RS to reject the EITC claims of undocumented workers. It also allowed
the 1RS to reject both electronic returns with missing, invalid or duplicated SSNs, and to
delay paper returns with similar problems until investigators could look into the claim.
Another study, conducted in tax year 1997, determined the noncompliance rate to be
around $9.3 billion or 31 percent. Even in 1994 and 1997, failure to meet the residency
test was the most common qualifying child error. Other errors were related to
complicated living arrangements. When the child meets the rules to be a qualifying child
of more than one person, the person with the highest AGI was the one who had to claim
the child, even if the person with the highest AGI did not claim the child, the person with
the lower AGI could not claim the child. This rule does not apply if the other person is
the taxpayer’s spouse and they file a joint return. Misreporting of filing status was also a
cause of error, as well as married taxpayers who filed as single or head of household,
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when they should have filed as married filing separately. Individuals who file as married
filing separately are not eligible for the EITC. The last major source of error was
misreporting of earned income and underreporting of investment income.
The complexity of the EITC rules makes it difficult to assess whether the errors are
due to fi*aud or mistakes. It is especially difficult to know the intent behind the
taxpayers’ actions. In the 1997 tax year study, the 1RS estimated that one-half of the
returns with an EITC overclaim were due to intentional errors. However, the assessments
were judgmental and made without any specific criteria. Therefore, they were left out of
the report because of their lack of preciseness.
The subsequent Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 required paid tax return preparers to
fulfill certain due diligence requirements when preparing EITC claims for taxpayers,
allowed the 1RS to deny the EITC for several years to taxpayers who failed an audit
unless they could provide evidence of their eligibility through a recertification process,
gave the 1RS access to the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Federal
Case Registry of Child Support Orders (a federal database containing state information
on child support payments) to detect erroneous claims by noncustodial parents, as well as
requiring the Social Security Administration to collect SSNs of birthparents and provide
the 1RS with information linking the parents’ and child’s SSNs. Furthermore, Congress
began providing funds ($143 million a year) for a five year EITC compliance initiative
beginning in fiscal year 1998.
However, one must keep in mind that the EITC error percentage reported by the 1RS
is the number that is erroneously claimed and not the one that is erroneously paid out.
The 1RS does catch some errors. Consequently, in 1994, the actual percentage should
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have been 20.7 percent. Furthermore, the study does not take into account
underpayment, which is estimated around two percent. Therefore, the EITC is not that
much higher than the error rate for income tax as a whole, which is approximately fifteen
percent. Moreover, many elements of the income tax have much higher error rates. The
1RS estimates that twenty to thirty percent of business income is not reported on tax
returns. It is further estimated that $100 billion is lost every year due to errors and fraud
in individual and corporate income tax. The EITC losses account for less than five
percent of this amount. Unreported business income alone results in $40 billion in lost
individual income tax collections, substantially more than the EITC’s entire cost.“ ^
However, studies have yet to be reported on the effects of the changes since 1997 on the
EITC compliance rate. Once those are available, the compliance issue will be easier to
evaluate.
The CCTB compliance rate has not been studied extensively due to the recentness of
the program. However, the Child Tax Benefit, which is the first tier of the CCTB and has
been in place since 1993, was studied during the tax year 1997-98 and results indicated
that the overall payment level was accurate. However, the money was not always going
to the right person. It was estimated that five to five and a half percent of the population
was not being paid the right amount. Underpayments accounted for about $70-75 million
while overpayments were estimated at $75-100 million. These numbers almost cancel
each other out and represent a very small percentage of the $5 billion being paid a year.

*' ' Robert Greenstein and Isaac Shapiro, New Research Findings on the Effects o f the Earned Income Tax
Credit, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 1998, available from
<http://www.cbpp.org/31leitc.htm> Internet; accessed 21 October 2002.
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Chapter 4
The future of the Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Canada Child Tax Benefit
Findings
After having assessed the characteristics of the EITC and the CCTB, one could
conclude that both programs have an effect on child poverty, however minor it is. It is
estimated that the EITC raised 14 percent of poor children above the poverty line in 2001,
while the CCTB raised 6 percent of low-income children above the LICO in 1998-1999,
its first year of operation. The programs are only targeting a limited number of poor
children. Most other industrialized countries have significantly lower child poverty rates
because government transfers to the poor are considerably more generous.
Tax-transfer programs have certain advantages over other safety net programs. They
have lower administrative costs, and since they tend to be based largely on labor
earnings, they encourage work. Furthermore, they are an income-tested transfer, and
therefore, based on need. Nonetheless, by discounting earnings from other sources, such
as welfare payments, the impact of tax-transfer programs on the poverty rate and poverty
gap is severely limited. While the first-tier of the CCTB applies social assistance income
to its calculations, the second-tier, which is the more specific anti-child poverty tier,
allows provinces to count the NCBS as income, and therefore, deduct the amount from
welfare benefits, substantially reducing its ability to combat child poverty. Both the
EITC and the NCBS are successful at helping the poor hovering near the poverty line, but
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ineffective at helping those well-below the threshold, and therefore do not significantly
affect the poverty gap.
While the EITC and the CCTB are income-tested transfers, they do not target need
effectively. The EITC does not reach out to those in need without labor earnings, and the
CCTB professes to reach out to those in need, only to subsequently deduct the transfer
through income disregards of social assistance programs. Therefore, the EITC and the
CCTB are successful at meeting the needs of families with “few needs.” Those living
well-below the poverty line must resort to social assistance, if it is even an option. As
both the United States and Canada are now implementing “workfare” measures, welfare
is no longer a program of last resort for all living in poverty. Those who cannot meet the
new “welfare requirements” are left without options.
Overall, the EITC and the CCTB have been somewhat successful at targeting the
intended recipients. The one-parent families, the lower-income families, and those with
more than one child receive higher benefits. Unfortunately, the EITC’s phase-in rate,
established to encourage work, inhibits lower income families from receiving more
benefits, as need would dictate. Furthermore, the lack of differentiation by family size
larger than one or two children in the United States, limits the antipoverty effect of the
EITC, as larger families have greater needs. Both these barriers to poverty reduction are
unlikely to change, as they exist to encourage more work hours and smaller families
among the poor. In contrast, the CCTB does not have a phase-in range, and therefore,
awards the maximum credit to those in the “phase-in and stationary range” (actually one
range). Furthermore, the CCTB takes family size and age of children (under seven) into
account when delivering its benefits. Larger families receive larger benefits. However,
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the per child supplements are not substantial, and therefore do not significantly reduce
child poverty. Both the EITC and the CCTB award a large percentage of their credit to
those above the poverty line. 63 percent of EITC beneficiaries are above the poverty
line; while the CCTB statistics are not as clear-cut, nonetheless, 76 percent of recipient
families earn more than $15,000 and 60 percent of recipient families earn more than
$26,000. The percentage of families above the poverty line is quite similar for both
programs. These statistics point to a need to restructure the programs to target more
families below the poverty line if it is to take its goal of anti-child poverty seriously.
Tax-transfer programs are assumed to have an effect, even if limited, on employment
rate. Since they lessen the marginal costs associated with returns to the workforce, they
encourage individuals to enter the labor market. The EITC has been proven to increase
the employment of single-mothers more than any other group. As this group tends to be
poorer than other groups, these results are encouraging. However, a return to the
workforce does not necessarily imply that the women and their families are moving
above the poverty line. Due to its recentness, the CCTB has not yet been proven to have
a positive effect on employment.
Welfare caseload effects are even more difficult to assess. Both the United States
and Canada have undergone major reforms in their social policy, particularly in their
programs of last resort (welfare) since the mid-1990s. Therefore, it is difficult to
differentiate between welfare reforms, economy recovery, and expansions (or
establishment) of the EITC and the CCTB, to measure the true impact of the latter on
welfare caseload.
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The EITC and the CCTB have had a positive effect on child poverty rate and gap,
yet, their impact is limited and suggests that both programs provide the bare minimum to
attest to their success and justify their existence. Nonetheless, both programs have the
potential to be serious players in the fight against child poverty if their credit amounts are
increased and they allow welfare recipients to benefit from the credits. Until these
changes are enacted, both programs will remain limited, on the other hand; they will also
remain uncontroversial and popular with the public.

Proposed reforms to the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Canada
Child Tax Benefit
While many of the proposed reforms have been mentioned in passing in previous
sections, they will be outlined in more detail in this section. As it stands, the EITC’s
contribution to the child poverty fight is modest. Most proposals to modify the EITC
include increases in the credit rate and adjustments of benefits by family size. An across
the board increase in the EITC would help more low-income families and make work
more attractive relative to welfare. The larger credits are required to aid families with
more than two children leave poverty since the current credit amounts do not take their
needs into account. The EITC provides less assistance to larger families.
Table 4.1

Low-Wage Work, EIC, and Poverty Status in 1988.

Credit as
Post Transfer
Fraction of
Income (% of
Family Size
Poverty
Poverty
Threshold (%)
Threshold)
$7,701
$9,375
11.3
122
2
$9,428
$9,375
9.3
99
3
$12,008
$9,375
7.3
78
4
$14,301
$9,375
6.1
66
5
Source: Saul D. Hof inan and Laurence S. Seidman, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Antipoverty
Effectiveness and Labor Market Effects (Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, 1990), 63.
Poverty
Threshold

Year-Round FullTime Earnings +
EITC
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Table 4.1 communicates the pattern of inequality that exists between families of
different sizes. It demonstrates that as family size increases, the credit as a fraction of the
poverty threshold decreases substantially. Since 1993 the credit differentiates between
one and two children families, however, it still does not reflect the increasing needs of
families with more than two children. The Table also illustrates how large the increases
would have to be to bring families up to the threshold level. Two approaches to remedy
the inequality in family size are possible. First, the credit would be adjusted for each
additional child to represent the same percentage of the poverty threshold as that of one
child. Phase-in rates would also have to be adjusted in this scenario. The second
approach varies the maximum income on which the credit can be earned rather than the
credit rate.^^^ These scenarios are illustrated in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2

Alternative EITC Family Size Adjustments

Family Size

Poverty
Threshold
$7,701
$9,428
$12,008
$14,301

Maximum
Credit
$875
$1,070
$1,363
$1,623

(1988).

Phase-In
Rate
14.0%
17.1%
21.8%
26.0%

Earning
Threshold
$6,250
$7,643
$9,736
$11,593

2
3
4
5
Source: Saul D. Hof! man and Laurence S. Seidman, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Antipoverty
Effectiveness and Labor Market Effects (Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, 1990), 67.

Many issues come up when attempting to devise an EITC structure that would better
meet the needs of the poor. If the phase-in rate is increased, the maximum earnings at
which the credit can be received will also be increased. Therefore, not only will poorer
families receive larger credits, but also families above the poverty line. Therefore, the
costs of the program increase substantially. While the phase-out rate could be increased,
this would create labor supply disincentives. Yet another proposal is extending the
Hofi&nan, “The Earned Income Tax Credit”, 67.
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stationary range, providing the maximum credit to those in the phase-in range as well.
This would involve eliminating the phase-in range (as is seen in the CCTB). This
amendment would not increase costs substantially, as only 24 percent of families with
children are in the phase-in range.

There is no clear-cut solution to the proposed

reforms as each has trade-offs.
Other proposals for reform involve integrating the Child Tax Credit with the EITC,
therefore creating a basic tier, and ensuring that the majority of families receive some
form of child benefit. This would further simplify the tax system, aid in the fight against
noncompliance, and reduce the workload of the 1RS. Other approaches involve creating
federal incentives for states to enact or expand their EITCs. Many states have non
refundable EITC, which could have a larger impact on poverty reduction if they were
converted to refundable credits.
Other concerns are due to the high implicit marginal tax rate in the phase-out range.
The phase-out rate is analogous to a marginal tax rate. This problem applies to any sort
of benefit that is conditioned by the recipient’s income; as individuals increase their
incomes, there are negative consequences in terms of taxes paid. The extent of the tax
could discourage work. Since 60 percent of EITC recipients are in the phase-out range,
lowering the tax could encourage greater work effort.
Adjusting the EITC for family size and increasing the credit rate are the two most
crucial reforms. Children in families with three or more children have poverty rates of 29
percent, and 23 percent when the EITC and various non-cash benefits are counted. In
both cases, this is more than double the poverty rate among children in smaller
Kim, “The EflFects of the Earned Income Tax Credit”, 20.
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fam ilies/Furtherm ore, larger families have more difficulty making the transition
between welfare and work, as expenditures increase with more children, as do TANF
benefits, while wages do not rise with family size Thus, by increasing the credits for
families with three or more children, the EITC could more effectively encourage work
and reduce poverty among more children. By adding an additional tier for families with
three or more children, the costs of the EITC would only be increased by $700-$800
million a year, as only about 15 percent of EITC recipient families with children have
three or more children.
A further expansion to the EITC would be to extend the credit to families on social
assistance. As two-thirds of children in extreme poverty (with incomes below 50 percent
of the poverty line) have no access to the EITC, the definition of “income” must be
modified in order for the credit to assist more children living in extreme poverty. Not
only must the credit be increased, but it must be expanded to incorporate the extreme
poor within its reach. By eliminating the current Exemptions for Children, which mainly
aid families above the poverty line, the increases in the EITC could be funded. If the
Child Tax Benefit and a more expansive EITC were integrated, all families would receive
some form of child benefits. The child benefit system would be characterized by
progressive targeting, aiding more families in need. Furthermore, if the EITC were
modified to be delivered on a monthly basis to recipients, it would be more responsive to
the needs of beneficiaries. Integration of EITC advance payments and the TANF and
Food Stamp delivery system would fiirther meet the needs of the poor.

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Should EITC Benefits be Enlargedfor Families with Three or
More Children?^ July 2000, available £rom< http://www.cbpp.org> Internet; accessed 21 October 2002.
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The CCTB has already incorporated many of the reforms proposed for the EITC.
The program already provides supplements for families with more than two children,
although they are not significant in the NCBS. They could be increased to further reduce
poverty among low-income families with three or more children. Furthermore, the
CCTB already has a two-tier structure and no phase-in rate. The maximum credit is
offered to all recipients below the maximum income where phase-out begins. The
program has already integrated previous child exemptions and other child benefits within
one structure and is currently offered on a monthly basis to all recipients. It can be
modified if parents separate or a spouse dies. In addition, the CCTB extends the credit to
those receiving social assistance. However, the second-tier, the NCBS, is deducted by
the provinces from the recipient’s welfare income. This eliminates the potential benefits
of the NCBS. As it is structured, it exists to aid those earning less than $22,000, yet, by
using it as an income disregard for social assistance programs completely eliminates the
idea behind the credit: to raise low-income families above the poverty line.
An across the board increase will also be necessary for the CCTB to have a more
substantial effect on child poverty. It has been estimated (conservatively) that $4,200 per
child annually is the amount required to lift most children in low-income families near
the poverty line. The increases in credit rate should be accompanied by a new definition
of income. Gross income rather than net income should be used to calculate the CCTB,
as using net income allows horizontal inequity, as families with the same gross income
receive different amounts of child benefits, depending on how much they are able to
deduct to reduce their net income for child benefit purposes. Vertical inequities also
occur when upper-income families end up with similar amounts of child benefit as
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middle-income families, and when some middle-income families qualify for the same
benefits as low-income families. Therefore, the use of net rather than gross income
results in a systematic bias in favor of higher-income families.

115

Benefitsfor Children, 135,
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Conclusion
Welfare legislation in the United States and Canada has undergone major reforms in
the last decade. Neither the United States nor Canada has an entitlement “welfare”
program. Canada discarded CAP in 1995, in favor of transfers to the provinces, which
they may use at their discretion. The United States followed suit in 1996 and replaced
the AFDC with TANF: block funds bestowed upon states, with requirements on time
limits. As long as states met the “time-limit” conditions and spent at least 75 percent of
what they paid out in the last year of the AFDC, they could structure their programs
according to their needs.
These reforms reflect the dislike by the public toward programs regarded as
handouts. In theory, most individuals feel that governments should not let their citizens
starve, however, in reality, when faced with policy choices, these same individuals will
vote to reduce taxes, cut social spending to the “undeserving poor”, and lately, increase
spending on military and security issues. The poor represent a large percentage of our
society, however, their collective voice does not carry much weight.
American and Canadian societies seem to have reached a critical juncture in public
policy. The masses no longer feel that their respective societies need to support the
“undeserving” poor. They are perceived as lazy and unwilling to take responsibility for
their fate and the fate of their families. Children are too often the innocent victims of
these views. It is not surprising, that in this era, programs such as the EITC and the
CCTB have gained popularity and their budgets have actually been increased. These
programs draw support across the ideological spectrum because they reduce child
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poverty, even if only minimally, and because they encourage work, discourage larger
families, and target children. However, the factors that make the EITC and the CCTB
popular, also limit their reach. Because the programs target the working poor, their
ability to effectively reduce child poverty is limited, as a large percentage of the poor are
not within reach of the tax system. In addition, since the programs limit the per child
credit, or in the case of the EITC do not offer per child credits beyond two children, the
effects of the credits are severally restricted, since larger families tend to be poorer. It
would appear as if the EITC and the CCTB are caught in a vicious cycle. The reforms
required for the programs to effectively combat child poverty, challenge the inherent
characteristics of the programs that guarantee their popularity. While the EITC and the
CCTB have the potential to eliminate or reduce child poverty, if they are expanded, their
expansion would most likely lead to their demise.
It the end, analyzing the effectiveness of child poverty programs is a farce, as the
United States and Canada do not strive to eliminate or seriously reduce child poverty.
They maintain programs that require the least amount of resources, avoid controversy,
and serve as decoy when their efforts are challenged. Much poorer countries have
significantly lower child poverty rates because there is a political will. Similarly, elderly
poverty has been reduced drastically since the latter have been labeled the deserving
poor. Children are not so lucky, even if, more than any other group they deserve to be
raised from poverty, as they are the future of our nation. They can contribute positively
or negatively to society, depending on what opportunities they are given during their
childhood years.
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The United States and Canada are quick to label other nations undemocratic or to
judge the manner in which these nations treat their citizens. However, the time has come
to look within our borders, and to evaluate our own actions. The neglect of our own
children is an affront to their rights, and an act of child exploitation by our governments.
In the end, there is no justification for turning our back on our children. They are the
future citizens, workers, parents, and leaders. They will ensure the survival of our
nations, however, only if our governments ensure their survival first.
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